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Abstract
In Chapter 1, we estimate the causal effect of homeownership on employment
using a regression discontinuity design that exploits an arbitrary threshold arising
from a homeownership program that assigns a house to low-income families in Chile.
We establish that homeownership decreases employment by between 3.95 and 5.60
percentage points. These results contrast with previous non-experimental literature,
which has often found positive effects. Our findings seem to be driven by children
of the heads of households not entering the labor market, rather than workers being
motivated to leave their job. We also find that residential stability and neighborhood
quality are unlikely to drive the effects, contrary to what has been proposed by
previous theoretical papers.
Chapter 2 studies the effect of homeownership on the academic achievements
of children in the household, using a regression discontinuity design that exploits an
arbitrary threshold arising from a voucher-based homeownership assistance program
in Chile. Despite the fact that the homeownership program substantially increases
the quality of the homes in which students live, I do not find that it affects their test
scores. In a subgroup analysis, I find that homeownership decreases the test scores
of elementary school students by 0.16 to 0.18 standard deviations. These effects
may be due to the fact that, when receiving a voucher, many families cease to live
with a hosting family, who are often close relatives (e.g. grand parents), and begin
living in their own house. This seems to suggest that students experience a decrease
in learning support that was previously provided to them by those close relatives.
My results contrast with previous studies, which have often found positive effects of
xi
homeownership on students’ academic achievements.
In Chapter 3, I exploit a plausibly exogenous variation in the characteristics
of principals to explore their effectiveness in improving school outcomes. Using a
difference-in-differences approach, I find that principals appointed under the reform
tend to be younger, less experienced, and more highly educated. Drawing from a
panel dataset of teacher responses, I observe that the new principals improve the
general climate in their schools by decreasing violence and expanding community
engagement. On the other hand, they do not improve teacher-monitoring practices,
teachers’ pedagogical methods, or students’ test results. A plausible explanation for
these results is the lack of positive or negative incentives given to principals based
on the performance of employees in their schools. Evidence in this paper suggests
that, in certain institutional settings, school principals do not seem to be as relevant
as is often assumed.
xii
Chapter 1
Moving “Away” from
Opportunities?:
Homeownership and
Employment.
1
1.1 Introduction
Homeownership is deeply entrenched within society across the Western world.
In the United States, President Bush once stated that “owning a home lies at the
heart of the American dream”; on the far corner of the American continent, in Chile,
President Bachelet expressed that “. . . people have organized and realized the dream
of homeownership”; and across the ocean, in the United Kingdom, David Cameron
claimed: “For years politicians have been talking about building what they call
affordable homes. . . What people want are homes they can actually own”. Conse-
quently, governments have attempted to make this aspiration materialize with ex-
tensive homeownership programs. Good Neighbor Next Door in the United States,1
Affordable Homes and Right to Buy in the United Kingdom,2,3 the Home Buyers’
Plan in Canada,4 and the Subsidio Habitacional in Chile are a few examples of a
long list of national government programs that attempt to make houses affordable
for families.5
Despite the strong public commitment to promoting homeownership, the
wider impact that owning a house can have on employment still remains in debate.
Economists have proposed various theories to predict the nature of this relation-
ship. On the one hand, McCormick (1983) pointed out that families transiting
from renting to outright homeownership experience an increase in their assets and
in their unearned income. Following a standard labor supply model, this should
increase their reservation wage and decrease their employment levels (Cahuc and
Zylberberg, 2004). Also predicting a negative effect, Oswald (1996) argues that
homeowners are less likely to be employed than renters, since they are less likely
to chase jobs across labor markets.6 On the other hand, Shroder (2002) suggests
that “take it or leave it”-styled housing incentives could increase labor supply,7 as
people may work more to earn additional money and buy a house in a more expen-
sive neighborhood, with better access to health and/or educational services. Goss
and Phillips (1997) also predicts a positive effect, arguing that homeowners tend
1 https://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/housing/sfh/reo/goodn/
gnndabot
2 https://www.gov.uk/topic/housing/funding-programmes
3 https://www.gov.uk/right-to-buy-buying-your-council-home/overview
4 http://www.cmhc-schl.gc.ca/en/co/buho/buho_008.cfm
5 http://www.minvu.cl/opensite_20150713124520.aspx
6 Oswald’s theory relies on the assumption that the costs associated with selling and buying a
house are higher than the ones of moving from one rental property to another.
7 “Take it or leave it” interventions are those in which individuals can either use the assistance
in the form that is offered (in this case, a voucher to purchase a house, rather than for example
money), or receive no assistance at all.
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to invest more in social capital and establish new networks in the place where they
settle, which can provide them with new labor market opportunities.8
In this paper, we estimate the causal effect of homeownership on labor sup-
ply by exploiting a Chilean homeownership program in which families are quasi-
randomly assigned a house. In this program, families apply to receive a voucher to
assist them in buying an already-constructed house in the market;9 and program
restrictions neither allow families to obtain a mortgage to complement their voucher,
nor to sell, rent or use the house as a collateral within 5 years. Since the number
of applicants far exceeds the number of vouchers, the Chilean government selects
voucher recipients by ranking applicant families - based on their poverty level and
family composition - and, following the ranking, assigns as many vouchers as the
budget permits. This method creates an arbitrary cutoff point. Among households
just above the cutoff point, 60 percent redeem their voucher and buy a home. Fol-
lowing this, we use a fuzzy regression discontinuity design to study the effect of
homeownership on employment for people of legal working age.10
Our results suggest that, four years after applying for the voucher, homeown-
ers’ employment rates decrease by between 3.95 and 5.60 percentage points (p.p.).11
In a further analysis we document that this effect is stronger among those that we
suspect to be the children of the head of the household, as well as those who were not
working at the moment of application.12 This implies that the effect arises mainly
from young people being disincentivized from entering the labor market, rather than
current workers being pushed out of it. A possible explanation for this result is that
low-income families often see working-age children as a potential source of “extra
income” (Field, 2003; Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2010).13 Since new homeowner
8 For a complete review of the potential effects of homeownership please see: Coulson and Fisher
(2002); Dietz and Haurin (2003); DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999); Munch et al. (2008).
9 This is the same program used in Navarrete (2016) to explore the effect of homeownership on
student learning. This program not only provides homeownership, but also a windfall in the form
of illiquid housing wealth, as the voucher covers around 96 percent of the cost of the house. Our
results study the joint effects of homeownership combined with this windfall.
10 Legal working age is fifteen years. The legal retirement age is sixty for women and sixty-five for
men.
11 For the average applicant, this corresponds to a point around 3 years after becoming a homeowner.
12 Unfortunately, we are not able to observe the relationship between each household member. We
thus define as the head of the household the family member who submitted the application, and
so we do not make any assumptions about the gender or age of this person. We define as a spouse
a household member who is within 15 years of age of the head of the household. Finally, a child
is any household member who is 15 or more years younger than the head of the household. On
average, children were at the end of high school at the moment of application and had been out
of high school for 2 years at the point when employment is measured.
13 These authors point out that poor families with no access to risk diversification, savings bank
accounts or insurance, must find alternative solutions. They often rely primarily on networks and
family members, and in particular, children of legal working age can provide additional sources
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parents receive an “extra source of income”, as they stop “paying rent” and do not
have to pay a mortgage, there is less pressure put on their working-age children to
join the labor market.
Contradicting some of the theoretical literature, we provide evidence suggest-
ing that spatial mobility is not the main driver of these results. In fact, we observe
that new homeowners are neither more nor less likely to move to a different labor
market. Furthermore, we document that the quality of the area in which new home-
owners live also does not seem to drive the effects. This last result, combined with
the fact that voucher recipients are more likely to become homeowners, differenti-
ates this study from the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) experiment, which offered
rental vouchers to families with the intention of improving their local environment
(Sanbonmatsu et al., 2014; Ludwig et al., 2013). While MTO studies the effects of
these improvements while keeping housing tenure constant; here, we are looking at
the effect of changes in housing tenure, but keeping residential area characteristics
constant.
We also provide evidence that voucher recipients are less likely to have one
or more children after applying. A potential explanation for this result is that
low-income families can perceive newborns as future insurance (Field, 2003; Galiani
and Schargrodsky, 2010). However, for voucher-recipient families studied here, this
insurance is provided by their house.
The primary contribution of our paper is to provide what we believe are
the first estimates of the effects of homeownership on labor supply that rely on
both a clearly exogenous source of identifying variation and a representative sample
of applicants to housing assistance programs. This paper also contributes to the
literature by providing evidence suggesting that the reduced spatial mobility of
homeowners is unlikely to be the main driving factor behind the effects, running
counter to the prevailing ideas in current literature.
This paper adds primarily to the literature related to homeownership and
employment. Although this literature is wide in scope, to the best of our knowledge
there has been no study in which homeownership is randomly or quasi-randomly
assigned.14 Furthermore, this paper could add to literature studying the relationship
of income to the household by joining the labor market. Additionally, young children can be seen
as a type of future insurance, able to provide care or shelter for elderly relatives.
14 Examples of previous literature are: Battu et al. (2008); Van Leuvensteijn and Koning (2004);
Goss and Phillips (1997); Munch et al. (2008); Valletta (2013); Flatau et al. (2003). The main
concern with all previous studies has been the endogeneity of homeownership and the potential
correlation between omitted variables and labor supply given the non-experimental methodology
used. For example: characteristics that are not observable to researchers could impact both the
tenure decisions and the outcome variable, such as savings discipline.
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between rental vouchers and employment (Jacob and Ludwig, 2012; Mills et al., 2006;
Sanbonmatsu et al., 2014), governmental transfers and employment (David et al.,
2016; Alzu´a et al., 2013; Picchio et al., 2017; Imbens et al., 2001), and property
rights and employment (Field, 2007; Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2010).
Section 1.2 presents the program studied here. Section 1.3 then provides an
overview of the data used in this paper. Section 1.4 presents the empirical strategy
of the paper. In Section 1.5, we discuss the regression discontinuity validity in
further depth. Section 1.6 presents the results, Section 1.7 the potential mechanisms,
Section 1.8 presents a rationalization of the results and Section 1.9 concludes.
1.2 The Homeownership Program
Chile has a long tradition of offering subsidized housing to disadvantaged
families. Historical accounts show that Chilean housing policy, established in 1906,
was designed with a focus on improving the housing conditions of the poorest
Chileans.15 Current housing policies target the poorest 40 percent of the popu-
lation, and recently the main focus has moved towards providing disadvantaged
families with financial assistance to help them to buy their own house.
In the program analyzed in this paper, called Adquisicio´n de Vivienda Con-
stru´ıda (AVC), families must submit an application to obtain a homeownership
voucher from the government.16 This voucher must be used to buy a house in the
market that has already been built, and the number of applicants far exceeds the
number of vouchers offered (for a complete description of the program see Appendix
1.A).
In the AVC, families apply through a regional office of the Ministry of Hous-
ing and Urbanism (MINVU, from its Spanish name: “Ministerio de Vivienda y
Urbanismo”), selecting a particular region in which they would like to purchase a
house.17 To prevent a strategic approach to this process, families are only permitted
to apply within one single region and are automatically excluded from the process if
they apply in multiple regions. In the application process, families must also provide
certificates proving that they belong to the poorest 40 percent of the population,
and that they have had savings of at least 400 USD in a bank account for a year;
if not, they are also excluded from the process. In the final step before applications
are closed, the government identifies whether any member of the household already
owns a house; if so, these households are also excluded.
15 For a complete review of Chilean housing policy, see Rubio (2006); Rodrigo (1999).
16 In every new offer round, families must submit a new application.
17 Chile is divided into 15 regions, which are the country’s highest level of administrative division.
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Once the application period has expired, the selection process is made ac-
cording to regional rankings and budgetary restrictions. The MINVU first assigns
a score to each application based on two factors - the family composition and their
poverty level - and then ranks applications at a regional level according to their
score. With these regional rankings, the MINVU then assigns as many vouchers as
its regional budget will allow.18
Vouchers from the AVC program cover the difference between the market
price of the house and the family’s accredited savings at the moment of application,
up to a value of 25,000 USD. To prevent this money from being used for unrelated
expenses, the vouchers are issued in the form of certificates. The voucher’s cor-
responding monetary value is only transferred to the seller of the house after the
property contract has been signed.
The AVC housing vouchers are subject to a number of regulations. Recipient
families are given a maximum timeframe of two years in which they can use their
voucher; after this period, it expires permanently. Second, families cannot buy
a house owned by a relative - this is checked against the government’s own official
family records. Third, families are not allowed to complement their MINVU voucher
with financial credits when purchasing a house.19 Finally, families are prohibited
from selling and renting the house, or using it as collateral for credit during the
first five years of ownership, and must live in the house over this initial period. The
Ministry of Housing pays visits to voucher-bought houses and checks whether the
recipient family is indeed living in the house. If families do not to comply with
this, they either automatically lose their purchased house or are forced to repay the
voucher’s monetary value to the MINVU.20
In this study, we use data from the 2010 and 2011 AVC offer rounds. Offers
from earlier years were not included as MINVU funds were not exhausted and so no
cutoff point was generated. In 2012 and 2013 there were no offers as AVC resources
were focused on housing reconstruction following the 2010 earthquake. Although
the program was reintroduced from 2014 onwards, the short timespan between the
offers and the follow-up data results renders these rounds of offers unsuitable for
analysis.
18 The number of vouchers delivered under this program represents less than 3 percent of total
transactions in the Chilean housing market.
19 This prevents a situation in which a financial institution is able to take over a subsidized property
following defaults on payments by voucher recipients.
20 These features are also common in other housing programs, such as the program discussed in
Barnhardt et al. (2017).
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1.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
1.3.1 Heads of Families and Family Member Dataset
To identify the heads of families, and their corresponding family members,
the MINVU has provided us with four different datasets. The first dataset contains
the 125,213 heads of families who applied for a voucher in 2010 and 2011. The
variables within this dataset are the application score, the family ID, the head
of family ID, their town and region of residence when applying, their region of
application, the offer round to which they applied, and whether the family received
a voucher offer or not.
The second dataset contains information regarding the family members in-
cluded in the application of each head of family. The variables in this dataset are
the family ID, the ID of each member of the family, and the offer round of the
application. We link both datasets using the family ID and the offer round. The
linked dataset contains 362,698 individuals when counting heads of families and all
family members (henceforth referred to as applicants).21
A third dataset tells us whether or not a voucher was paid out and, if so,
the amount paid. A separate dataset tells us the date at which the vouchers were
paid. This last dataset is incomplete, and we can only correctly match 93 percent of
voucher users with their date of voucher payment.22 These two datasets are merged
with the previous information sources using the family ID.
In a fourth dataset, the MINVU provided us with each applicant’s date of
birth, gender, any children born after applying, and the town of residence four years
after applying. MINVU has also provided us with some housing characteristics four
years after applying, such as whether the family lives in an apartment, the number
of rooms used as bedrooms by the family, whether the family lives in a house without
a concrete floor or potable water (referred to as a rudimentary house), and whether
the family lives in another family’s house (referred to as a hosting family).23 We
successfully link all applicants with their corresponding variables, excluding 4,915
whose gender could not be identified from MINVU records. Following from the data
showing the municipality of residence four years after applying, we collected the
21 We use the family ID to cluster standard errors by family, as most of the outcomes are likely
to be correlated at the family level. As a check for robustness, we run the analysis clustering
standard errors at the municipal level, to allow outcomes to be correlated at this level. This does
not changes the results (see Appendix C5).
22 MINVU has tried to centrally keep track of these dates, however on some occasions regional
offices do not report it, as it was not a mandatory process in 2010 and 2011.
23 We do not have access to information regarding the specifics of hosting families, however they
tend to be close relatives such as parents (CASEN, 2013).
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most recent measure of poverty for each municipality (2013) from the Ministry of
Planning.24
After combining all sources, we examine each regional voucher assignment
process to determine whether some regions did not have any applicants who did not
receive a voucher. Out of 43 regional assignment processes,25 we found 3 in which
all families were offered a voucher. We further analyzed each applicant’s region
of application, and identified 161 applicants for whom this variable was missing.26
We removed from the sample these regional assignment processes that had no non-
recipients and all applicants for whom the region of application was missing.
Finally, we centered the cutoff scores from every round of offers and region to
zero. We then calculated the centered scores of each application by subtracting the
corresponding cutoff from each particular application score. The new score variable
ranges from -994 to 986.1 in degrees of 0.1.
1.3.2 Unemployment Insurance Dataset
The Ministry of Labor provided us with the wage and date of payment for
every applicant with unemployment insurance between January 2010 and December
2015.
As the most recent employment data to which we have access is from Decem-
ber 2015, we can measure labor market outcomes for four years beyond the point
at which families applied for a voucher. This means that we use 2014 employment
data for offer rounds in 2010 and 2015 employment data for offers in 2011.
Using this dataset, we construct the following variables:
• Employed: equal to 1 if the applicant is in the Unemployment Insurance
dataset in a given month and equal to 0 otherwise.
• Wage: equal to the observed wage in the Unemployment Insurance dataset (in
US dollars) for a given month and equal to 0 if the applicant has no observed
wage for that month.
• White-Collar Job: equal to 1 if the applicant works in commerce, financial
services, hotels and accommodation, international organizations, communica-
tions, or health or educational institutions and equal to 0 otherwise.
24 http://observatorio.ministeriodesarrollosocial.gob.cl/indicadores/datos_pobreza_
comunal.php
25 There were 2 national offer rounds in 2010 and 1 in 2011. These occurred in all 15 regions, except
for the Santiago Metropolitan Region, which participated in neither of the 2010 offer rounds. This
accounts for the total of 43 regional assignment processes.
26 This is most likely to have occurred due to a clerical or typing error at the database level.
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We also computed applicants’ working status, wage, and ‘white-collar’ mea-
sures 2 months before applying as baseline measures. We combine this with the
previous dataset using the applicant IDs.
In the final step, we restricted the sample to those applicants who are of
legal working age. According to the Chilean Labor Code, the minimum working
age is fifteen years (Chilean National Congress, 2002). To legally claim pension
benefits, the minimum retirement age is sixty for women and sixty-five for men
(Chilean National Congress, 2009).27 Since the legal working age limit is dependent
on gender, applicants whose genders could not be identified were removed from the
sample. This process left us with 231,496 applicants.
It is worth noting that the unemployment insurance dataset contains only
those workers who have a formal contract, and so excludes the self-employed, inde-
pendent contractors, civil servants, and members of military forces. We address the
implications of this on our results in section 1.6.1. Also, our dataset unfortunately
does not provide the number of hours worked by employees. We can thus only in-
vestigate the effect of this program on the applicants’ decision of whether or not
to supply labor (extensive margin), but cannot observe the effect on the number of
hours supplied by applicants who work (intensive margin).
1.3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1.1 provides summary statistics for applicants of legal working age
prior to applying, and shows that the average age across the sample is 32 years.
Applicants who go on to receive a voucher are around two years younger than those
who do not. A possible explanation for this is that families with young children
receive a higher score in the poverty index, thus implying that younger parents will
be more likely to receive the voucher (for a complete description of the poverty
index see Appendix 1.B). This table also shows that the share of females in the
sample remains stable at around 66% across the five groups. This implies that
households with a high share of females tend to apply for the voucher in higher
numbers, however this does not seem to be correlated with receiving a voucher.
Applicants are on average in the 12th decile of the poorest families of the
population. Those that go on to receive a voucher are on average in the poorest 8th
decile of families. This is not surprising, given that the single biggest component
of applicants’ scoring is their poverty level, with poorer families receiving a higher
score. In these figures, we can observe also that families in our sample are among
27 The Chilean population tends to retire shortly after reaching this retirement age, with the average
Chilean woman starting to receive a pension at age sixty-one, and the average man at sixty-five.
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Table 1.1: Characteristics of Voucher Recipients and Non-Recipients
Before Applying
Sample Non-Recipients Recipients Voucher users Voucher non-users
Age 32.343 32.557 30.040 30.038 30.042
(11.903) (11.947) (11.162) (11.323) (11.065)
Female 0.654 0.653 0.668 0.656 0.676
(0.476) (0.476) (0.471) (0.475) (0.468)
% of Poverty dist 12.233 12.597 8.313 8.588 8.147
(7.420) (7.429) (6.073) (6.370) (5.880)
Metropolitan Area 0.446 0.447 0.427 0.395 0.446
(0.497) (0.497) (0.495) (0.489) (0.497)
Disabled Family Member 0.035 0.035 0.041 0.044 0.040
(0.185) (0.183) (0.199) (0.206) (0.195)
Elderly Family Member 0.035 0.035 0.026 0.033 0.023
(0.183) (0.185) (0.161) (0.178) (0.149)
App. to Another Region 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000
(0.030) (0.031) (0.026) (0.042) (0.000)
Employment 0.243 0. 247 0. 201 0. 200 0. 203
(0.429) (0.431) (0.401) (0.400) (0. 402)
Wage (USD) 109.5434 110.7805 96.20908 93.91537 100.010
(245.285) (245.145) (246.402) (239.789) (256.959)
2010 Offer Round 0.303 0.305 0.283 0.259 0.298
(0.460) (0.460) (0.451) (0.438) (0.457)
Voucher Value (USD) 16584.420
(3148.344)
Observations 230247 210699 19548 7358 12190
Notes: Data is for applicants of legal working age, four years after applying to the 2010 and 2011 offer rounds. Age is the aver-
age age of applicants measured in years. Female is the share of applicants of legal working age that are females. % of Poverty
dist is the average decile of applicants’ poverty distribution with respect to the Chilean population. Metropolitan Area is the
share of applicants that apply for a voucher in the Santiago Metropolitan Region. Disabled Family Member is the share of ap-
plicants in families with a handicapped family member. Elderly Family Member is the share of applicants in families with an
elderly family member. App. to Another Region is the share of applicants that apply to buy a house in a different region to
their region of residency. Employment is the share of applicants that were employed 2 months before applying. Wage is the
average observed wage 2 months before applying. 2010 Offer Round is the share of applicants in the sample that applied for
an offer in 2010. Voucher Value is the average value of the executed voucher in US dollars.
the poorest of the Chilean population.
Around 44 percent of applicants submitted an application to buy a house
in the Santiago Metropolitan Region. This is in line with the share of the Chilean
population that lives in this area. Voucher non-users tend to be more concentrated
in this area. A potential explanation for this difference is that the housing market
is tighter in this area, and therefore the voucher may not provide a realistic sum of
money to purchase a house.
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The share of families that have a disabled or elderly family member, or that
applied to a different region from the one in which they live, is remarkably low in all
groups. The employment level of applicants before applying is around 24 percent,
and voucher recipients show employment levels that are 4 percent lower.
The characteristics of applicants in this program - women in their early thir-
ties with low employment levels - are remarkably similar to those applying to other
programs offering different types of housing assistance such as MTO (Sanbonmatsu
et al., 2014), the Section 8 program in the United States (Jacob and Ludwig, 2012),
and the small-scale Indian program analyzed in Barnhardt et al. (2017). These types
of families are thus the most likely to apply for housing assistance, irrespective of
its nature.
The average voucher value in the sample is 16,584 USD. Combining the fact
that the average voucher recipient is at the 8th decile of the poverty distribution in
the Chilean population with the distribution of wages in Chile, we compute that this
value is equivalent to 10 years of wages for the average voucher recipient (CASEN,
2013).
1.4 Empirical Strategy
We use a regression discontinuity (RD) approach to estimate the impact
of becoming a homeowner under the AVC program on employment. We rely on
the fact that an applicant’s voucher offer status changes discontinuously at the
eligibility threshold. Then, we narrow our focus to the set of applicants close to the
cutoff under the following assumption: those applicants who only just missed out
on receiving a voucher can serve as a good counterfactual for those who only just
received it. The plausibility of these assumptions is covered in the next section, but
first we will describe the set of equations used.
1.4.1 The Effect of Receiving an Offer for a Voucher
The first step in becoming a homeowner under the AVC program is receiving
an offer for a voucher, which can alone have an effect on applicants’ behavior. To
estimate the causal effect of receiving an offer on a given outcome for applicants
around the cutoff, the so-called Intention To Treat (ITT), we perform the following
OLS regression:
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y i,r,c,t = α0 + ηr,c + α1f (Scorei,r,c) + βITTDi,r,c + α2Di,r,c ∗ f (Scorei,r,c)
+ ΠX + ei,r,c,t
(1.1)
where y i,r,c,t is the outcome of interest for applicant i, in region of application r,
offer round c, and at time t. α0 is the constant of the equation and γr,c is a region-
offer round fixed effect. Scorei,r,c is the application score for applicant i, in region
of application r, and offer round c. We study the robustness to different functional
forms of Scorei,r,c for the RD polynomial, using f ( ), which is estimated separately on
either side of the cutoff.28 X controls for a set of family and individual characteristics
including the poverty level, gender, age, working status and wage before applying of
applicant i, as well as dummies for whether their family has a disabled or an elderly
member.
Di,r,c is a dummy for receiving an offer for a voucher, which is defined as
follows:
Di,r,c =
1 if Scorei,r,c ≥ 00 if Scorei,r,c < 0
The coefficient of interest is βITT , which estimates the causal effect of receiving
an offer for a voucher on the outcome of interest, for applicants around the cutoff
score. To select the optimal distance from the cutoff to make voucher recipients
and non-recipients “locally” comparable, we use the optimal bandwidth proposed
by Calonico et al. (2014). Throughout the analysis, we cluster standard errors by
family, as all the different measurements are likely to be correlated at the family
level.29
1.4.2 The Effect of Using the Homeownership Voucher
If all families that received a voucher were to use it to buy a house, we
could use equation 1.1 to estimate the causal effect of homeownership under this
program on the outcome of interest. Since not all families redeem their voucher, the
parameter of interest in Equation 1.1 - βITT - will not capture the desired causal
effect.
28 The literature has a long history of using different polynomials. Gelman and Imbens (2014)
points out that the polynomial order should not be higher than 2.
29 As a robustness check, we run the analysis clustering standard errors at the municipal level, to
allow outcomes to be correlated at this level (see Appendix C5).
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To estimate the desired causal effect, we use the voucher assignment indi-
cator as an instrument for homeownership, and perform a Two-Stage Least Square
regression. The set of equations estimated is as follows:
Homeownershipi,r,c,t = γ0 + µr,c + γ1f (Scorei,r,c) + βDi,r,c
+ γ2Di,r,c ∗ f (Scorei,r,c) + ΓX + ui,r,c,t
(1.2)
yi,r,c,t = δ0 + κr,c + δ1f (Scorei,r,c) + βLATEHomeownershipi,r,c,t
+ δ2Di,r,c ∗ f (Scorei,r,c) + ΩX + vi,r,c,t
(1.3)
where Homeownershipi,r,c,t is a dummy indicator, equal to 1 if the applicant i, in
region of application r, offer round c, and at time t bought a house using the voucher
and 0 otherwise. The remaining terms are defined as in the previous section. The
optimal distance from the cutoff, to make voucher recipients and non-recipients
“locally” comparable, is also computed using the optimal bandwidth proposed by
Calonico et al. (2014).
In Equation 1.3, βLATE captures the causal effect of using a voucher to buy
a house on the outcome of interest for applicants around the cutoff, the so-called
Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE). Our results and interpretations are based
on βLATE ; however, for completeness, we report βITT as well.
1.5 Regression Discontinuity Validity
1.5.1 The Effect of the Being Above the Eligibility Cutoff on Voucher
Utilization and House Characteristics
We begin by showing that being above the eligibility cutoff score for receiving
an offer for a voucher increases the likelihood of becoming a homeowner, the so-called
First Stage. To do this, we estimate Equation 1.1 using as an outcome variable a
dummy equal to 1 if the family of the applicant has ever purchased a house using a
homeownership voucher after 2010 and 0 otherwise.
The left panel of Figure 1.1 shows that being above the cutoff increases the
program take-up by around 60 percent.30 Point estimates do not vary greatly if we
30 To get some sense of the size of the first stage, these point estimates are 20 p.p. higher than
the ones in renting programs such as MTO (Sanbonmatsu et al., 2014) and Section 8 (Jacob and
Ludwig, 2012), and 30 p.p. higher than in homeownership programs such as the one discussed in
Barnhardt et al. (2017).
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Figure 1.1: Effect of Voucher Offer on Utilization and Voucher Value
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Notes: Data is for applicants of legal working age, four years after applying to the
2010 and 2011 offer rounds. The left panel uses a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
applicant has ever bought a house using a homeownership voucher after 2010 and 0
otherwise. The right panel uses as a variable the value of the voucher redeemed by
the applicant after 2010. Each dot represents the mean of the corresponding outcome
for the applicants in a particular bin. The vertical line represents the eligibility cutoff
score for receiving an offer for a voucher.
control for Scorei,r,c with polynomials of order 1 or order 2. Table C1 in the appendix
confirm these results and shows that in both cases the estimation is significant at
the 1 percent level.
This panel also shows that some applicants below the cutoff point use the
voucher. This is due to two factors: 1) applicants can appeal to reverse the Ministry
of Housing’s decision not to offer them a voucher, and 2) applicants who did not
receive a voucher in an early round of offers may re-apply and receive a voucher
in a later one. Non-recipient applicants could also become homeowners by buying
a house in the market without using a voucher. We find it unlikely that families
close to the cutoff and who did not receive a voucher have sufficient money to buy a
house on the market - particularly when the average value of the voucher is already
10 times the annual salary of a worker at that level of the income distribution.
Unfortunately, we do not have data to see whether non-recipients families went on
to purchase a house without any assistance.
The left panel of Figure 1.1 also shows that some voucher recipients did not
redeem their voucher. Table 1.1 shows that poorer families and families who applied
in the Santiago Metropolitan Region are in fact less likely to redeem their voucher.
This could reflect two points: first, that poorer families face higher searching costs,
perhaps due to their personal networks being more limited in their ability to help
them with searching for a house; and second, that the voucher value might not be
sufficient for certain areas with a tighter housing market and more expensive houses,
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such as the Santiago Metropolitan Region.
The right panel of Figure 1.1 shows that applicants who are only just above
the cutoff score receive a large wealth shock in the form of a house. Appendix
Table C1 shows that this estimated wealth shock is around 20,000 USD in the
IV estimation. Given the restrictions and program conditions described in Section
1.3.1, in that new homeowners cannot sell or rent their house for 5 years, the wealth
transferred is extremely illiquid for the period under analysis.
By exploiting the date at which each voucher was paid, we aim to understand
how long families take to use their voucher and how long they have been homeowners
at different points after their application. Figure 1.2 shows the share of applicants
that used their voucher at different points in time, spaced by 6 months. This figure
illustrates that around 50 percent of families that use the voucher do so within 12
months of applying, with almost 75 percent doing so within 18 months (see the two
lower panels). Appendix Table C2 confirms that voucher utilization is around 30
p.p. 12 months after application and 47 p.p. 18 months after application. The
outcomes in Section 1.6 should thus be understood as if the applicants have been
homeowners on average for between 2.5 and 3 years.
In exploring the effect that voucher utilization has on house quality, we per-
form Equation 1.3, but using as an outcome of interest one of the house charac-
teristics described in Section 1.3.1. Figure 1.3 and Appendix Table C3 show that
homeownership under this program has a causal effect on reducing the probability
of applicants living with a hosting family (e.g. parents) by around 46 p.p., of living
in a rudimentary house (e.g. a house without a concrete floor or potable water) by
around 7 p.p., and increases the number of rooms that the family use as bedroom
by around 0.14 rooms. We do not observe any causal impact on the probability of
living in an apartment. Appendix Table C3 is also informative in two further ways:
1) the comparison group for voucher recipients is comprised of roughly 55 percent
of applicants who are renters and 45 percent who live with a hosting family,31 and;
2) living in a rudimentary house is not common for applicants in the absence of this
program.32
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Figure 1.2: Homeownership Voucher Utilization by Dates After
Applying
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Notes: Notes: Data is for applicants of legal working age, four years after applying to 2010
and 2011 offer rounds. The top left panel uses a dummy variable equal to 1 if the applicant
used a voucher to buy a house 6 months after applying and 0 otherwise. The top right panel
uses a dummy variable equal to 1 if the applicant used a voucher to buy a house 12 months
after applying and 0 otherwise. The bottom left panel uses a dummy variable equal to 1
if the applicant used a voucher to buy a house 18 months after applying and 0 otherwise.
The bottom right panel uses a dummy variable equal to 1 if the applicant used a voucher to
buy a house 24 months after applying and 0 otherwise. Each dot represents the mean of the
corresponding outcome variable for the applicants in a particular bin. The vertical line in
each panel represents the cutoff score for receiving a voucher offer.
1.5.2 The Continuity of the Share of Applicants Around the Cutoff
A key assumption in the regression discontinuity design is that applicants
cannot manipulate their application score, so they cannot actively choose to be
above the cutoff (McCrary, 2008). Qualitatively, if applicants are able to manipulate
the application score, we should see a discontinuity in the mass of applicants below
and above the cut-off.
31 Previous literature in both renting and homeownership programs have remained silent about
these proportions, most likely due to a lack of data.
32 The average share of non-recipient families living in a rudimentary house is around 8 p.p. This
differentiates our population from those analyzed in property rights literature, which contains a
large share of people without basic services Field (2007).
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Figure 1.3: Effect of Homeownership Voucher Utilization on House
Characteristics
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Notes: Data is for applicants of legal working age, four years after applying to 2010 and 2011
offer rounds. Living with a Hosting Family is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the applicant lives
in another family’s house and 0 otherwise. Rudimentary House is a dummy variable equal to
1 if applicant lives in a house without concrete floor or potable water and 0 otherwise. Number
of Rooms is the number of rooms that the family use as bedroom in the house. Apartment is
a dummy variable equal to 1 if the family lives in an apartment and 0 otherwise. Each dot
represents the mean of the corresponding outcome variable for the applicants in a particular
bin. The vertical line in each panel represents the cutoff score for receiving a voucher offer.
Point estimates and standard errors are from the IV regression (Equation 1.3).
When performing the McCrary test to determine whether this discontinuity
exists, we reject the manipulation of the score with a t-stat of -0.4068 and a p-value
of 0.6842. Figure 1.4 also shows no discontinuity around the cutoff in the number of
applicants. This suggests that applicants do not manipulate the application score
to be above the cutoff. This is not surprising given that applicants (and authorities)
do not know the cutoff ex-ante.
1.5.3 The Continuity of Applicant Characteristics Around the Cutoff
Under the identifying assumption of the RD estimator - that treatment and
control groups are locally comparable - predetermined covariates should be locally
balanced around the threshold (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). To test this, we estimate
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Figure 1.4: McCrary Test
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Notes: Data is for applicants of legal working age, four years after applying to
2010 and 2011 offer rounds. Each circle represents the share of applicants of
legal working age in a particular bin.
Equation 1.3 using as an outcome variable one of the predetermined covariates in
X described in Section 1.4.1.
Figure 1.5 does not show a discontinuity in the mean of any covariate around
the threshold. Table 1.2 confirms that there is no discontinuity in any of the prede-
termined covariates. This evidence suggests that the treatment is as good as locally
randomly assigned around the cutoff.
1.6 Results
We show that homeownership under this program decreases employment and
that the effect is concentrated among those who seem to be the child of the head of
the household and those who where not working at the time of application.
1.6.1 The Effect of the Homeownership Voucher on Employment and
Wages
The left panel of Figure 1.6 displays the causal relationship between employ-
ment level and homeownership under this program around the cutoff. This panel
shows that applicants who received an offer for a housing voucher - those whose
18
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Figure 1.5: Continuity of Covariates around the Cutoff
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Notes: Data is for applicants of legal working age, four years after applying to 2010 and 2011 offer rounds. Age is the age in
years of applicants. Female is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the applicant is female and 0 otherwise. Elderly Fam. Member is
a dummy variable equal to 1 if the family has an elderly family member when applying and 0 otherwise. Disabled Fam. Member
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the family has a handicapped family member when applying and 0 otherwise. Poverty Level in
the Population is the percentile of the applicant’s family poverty level with respect to the Chilean population. Employment BL
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the applicant was working before applying and 0 otherwise. Wage BL is the wage of applicants
before applying. White Collar Worker is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the applicant was working in a white collar job (as
defined in Section 1.3) and 0 otherwise. Each dot represents the mean of the pre-determined covariates for the applicants in
a particular bin. The vertical line in each panel represents the cutoff score for receiving a voucher offer. Point estimates and
standard errors are from the IV regression (equation 1.3).
application scores put them just above the eligibility threshold - are on average
less employed than applicants who did not receive one (control group). Columns 1
and 2 of Table 1.3 confirm these results and show that homeownership under this
program decreases employment by between 3.95 and 5.60 p.p. (by between 12 and
17 percent of the employment level of the control group). The effect is statistically
significant in all specifications. This piece of evidence suggests that homeownership
under this program has a negative causal effect on employment. This result is robust
to different bandwidths as shown in Appendix Figure D2.
It is worth noting that the level of employment is 32.5 p.p. in the control
group. Comparable levels of employment are found in studies focusing on similar
populations, over similar time spans and using similar datasets such as Moving to
Opportunity and Section 8.
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Figure 1.6: The Effect of the Homeownership Voucher on Employment
and Wages
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Notes: Data is for applicants of legal working age, four years after applying to 2010
and 2011 offer rounds. Employment is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the applicant
is working four years after applying and 0 otherwise. Wage USD is the applicant’s
observed wage four years after applying. Each dot represents the mean of the corre-
sponding outcome variable for the applicants in a particular bin. The vertical line in
each panel represents the cutoff score for receiving a voucher offer. Point estimates
and standard errors are from the IV regression (Equation 1.3).
As mentioned in Section 1.3.2, the UI dataset does not contain people who
work in the informal sector. We can provide two pieces of information to show
that this does not seem to represent a major problem in our estimations. First, the
share of the Chilean population of legal working age with unemployment insurance
is around 30 p.p., which shows that the population under study in this paper tends
to be more formalized than the overall Chilean population. This could potentially
reflect an inherent motivation amongst applicants, which may be unsurprising, given
that they must collect papers, save money, and go through the application process
in order to be in the sample. Second, the share of people of legal working age in
the informal sector is around 9.5 p.p.33 A back of the envelope estimation suggests
that the level of informality in the group of people who received the voucher - and
are around the cutoff - should be around 45 percent higher than those who did not
receive the voucher - and are around the cutoff - in order to cancel out the effects. In
light of these two pieces of information, we do not think that our lack of observation
of informal workers has a dramatic effect on our results.
Next, we attempt to analyze whether homeownership under this program has
an effect on wages. Since homeownership affects the likelihood of being employed,
we cannot study its effect on the wages of employed applicants: the populations
33 The Chilean National Institute of Statistics does not report this figure for the lowest 10 decile of
the population.
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employed to the left and to the right of the threshold are not comparable. Instead, we
conduct the analysis across the whole sample, assigning a wage of 0 to unemployed
individuals. The right panel of Figure 1.6 does not show a clear discontinuity around
the threshold for salaries of applicants. Table 1.3 suggests that homeownership has
a negative impact on wages, which is not robust across our specification (Columns 3
and 4). The results on wages seem ambiguous, not allowing us to draw conclusions
about the impact of homeownership on wages.
Table 1.3: The Effect of the Homeownership Voucher on Employment
and Wages
Employment Employment Wage USD Wage USD
(Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
IV Results
Homeownership IV -0.0560*** -0.0395** -42.96*** -14.06
(0.0115) (0.0186) (11.99) (19.15)
R-squared 0.161 0.161 0.213 0.212
ITT Results
Homeownership ITT -0.0359*** -0.0244** -27.24*** -9.009
(0.00726) (0.0107) (7.532) (11.19)
R-squared 0.164 0.164 0.215 0.215
Observations 55,916 55,916 48,292 48,292
BANDWIDTH 98 98 85 85
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES
OFFER ROUND FE YES YES YES YES
CONTROL MEAN .325 .325 251.56 251.56
Notes: Data is for applicants of legal working age, four years after applying to 2010 and 2011
offer rounds. Employment is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the applicant is working four years
after applying and 0 otherwise. Wage USD is the applicant’s observed wage four years after ap-
plying. Controls include gender, age, poverty level, elderly family member, disabled family mem-
ber, employment status before applying and wage before applying. Control Mean is the mean
of the corresponding outcome variable for applicants in the bandwidth who are below the cutoff
score. Standard errors are clustered at the family level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1.6.2 The Effect of the Homeownership Voucher on Employment by
Working Status When Applying and Gender
Looking at the heterogenous effects of homeownership under this program
on employment, Figure 1.7 shows that the effect is stronger for applicants who
22
Figure 1.7: The Effect of the Homeownership Voucher on Employment
by Working Status when Applying and by Gender
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Notes: Data is for applicants of legal working age, four years after applying to 2010 and 2011 offer rounds. Employment
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the applicant is working four years after applying and 0 otherwise. Wage USD is the
applicant’s observed wage four years after applying. Not Working when Applying is the subgroup of applicants who where
not working before applying. Working when Applying is the subgroup of applicants who where working before applying.
Men is the subgroup of applicants who are men. Women is the subgroup of applicants who are women. Each dot represents
the mean of the corresponding outcome for the applicants in a particular bin. The vertical line in each panel represents the
cutoff score for receiving a voucher offer. Point estimates and standard errors are from the IV regression (Equation 1.3).
were not working when they applied for the voucher (top left panel) compared to
applicants who were working at the time of application (top center panel). Table
1.5 confirms these results and shows a significant effect on non-working applicants
by between -6.18 and -5.35 p.p. (columns 1 and 2). For the group of applicants who
were employed when applying, the point estimate on employment - in the linear
and quadratic specifications - is around half the size of the previous one and not
significant (columns 3 and 4 of Table 1.5). These results suggest that the observed
negative impact on employment is stronger in its effect of preventing individuals
from joining the labor market than it is in leading those who are already employed
away from their work.
As the homeownership voucher seems to have no effect on applicants who
were working at the time of application, we analyze the effect on wages for this par-
ticular group: the employed populations to the left and to the right of the threshold
are comparable. The top right panel of Figure 1.7 does not show any discontinuity
in the wages of this particular subgroup. Columns 5 and 6 of Table 1.5 confirm
that there is no discontinuity in the wages of this group. This result seems to imply
that applicants who were working at the moment of applications either do not move
to lower or higher paid jobs or they do not change the number of hours that they
23
work.34
Considering gender, we do not find robust evidence showing that the effect
is different for men than for women. The bottom panels of Figure 1.7 suggest a
decrease in employment at the cutoff for both groups. Table 1.5 shows that in the
linear specification, homeownership under this program has a similar negative point
estimate for both groups. These results vary in our quadratic specification, as the
decrease in employment for women seems to be smaller. Since the results for gender
are not as conclusive as previous results, we cannot draw any conclusions for this
particular subgroup at this point. Appendix Figure D1 presents the age distribution,
showing that men are more concentrated in the younger age groups. If the age is an
important driver of the effect, this could partly explain these ambiguous results. We
will return to this discussion in the next section, where we discuss how the impacts
vary depending on the relationship of each applicant to the head of the household
and age.
1.6.3 The Effect of the Homeownership Voucher on Employment De-
pending on Each Applicant’s Relationship to the Head of the
Household.
In this section, we attempt to see who in the household is driving our observed
effects. Unfortunately we do not have access to the specific relationship of each
household member to the main applicant, but we are able to use the age of each
person as an indicator of this relationship. We thus define three exclusive groups: 1)
the Head of Household is the person who submitted the application;35 2) the Spouse
is a family member who is less than fifteen years younger or older than the Head of
Household ; and 3) the Child is a family member who is younger than the Head of
Household by fifteen years or more. These last two groups combined are referred to
as Not Head of Household throughout the rest of the paper.
Figure 1.8 shows that the effect is not driven by the head of the household
(top left panel), but rather by someone who is not the head of the household (top
right panel). The bottom two panels show that the child of the household is most
likely to be driving the effects. Table 1.5 confirms these results, showing that the
head of the household is not affected (columns 1 and 2), while children are the only
ones to show a robust effect. For this particular group, employment levels decrease
34 This may be due to people simply choosing whether or not they work at all, rather than the
number of hours that they work.
35 Under this definition, we do not make any assumptions about the age and gender of the head of
household.
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Figure 1.8: The Effect of the Homeownership Voucher on Employment
by Relationship to the Head of Household
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Notes: Data is for applicants of legal working age, four years after they applying
to 2010 and 2011 offer rounds. Employment a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
applicant is working four years after applying and 0 otherwise. Head of House-
hold is the person who submitted the application. Not Head of Household is any
household member who is not the Head of Household. Spouse is a family member
who is less than fifteen years younger or older than the head of household. Child
is a family member who is younger than the Head of Household by fifteen years or
more. Each dot represents the mean of Employment for the corresponding sub-
group of applicants in a particular bin. The vertical line in each panel represents
the cutoff score for receiving a voucher offer. Point estimates and standard errors
are from the IV regression (Equation 1.3).
by between -4.87 and -9.2 p.p. (columns 7 and 8).
Consistent with these results, Appendix Figure D3 presents the effect of
homeownership on employment by age and shows that the robust effects are mainly
driven by applicants who are younger than 30 years of age. This is in line with our
previous findings that the effect is mainly from family members who are at least 15
years younger than the main applicant.
A possible explanation for these result is that low-income families often see
working-age children as a potential source of “extra income” (Field, 2003; Galiani
26
and Schargrodsky, 2010).36 These working-age children are on average 20 years of
age, which means that at the moment of application they were finishing high school,
and at the time at which employment is measured, they had been out of school for
2 years. Since new homeowner parents effectively receive an extra source of income,
as they stop “paying rent” and do not have to pay a mortgage, there is less pressure
put on their working-age children to join the labor market.
Table 1.5: The Effect of the Homeownership Voucher on Employment
by Relationship to the Head of Household
Not Head of Household
Head of Household All Spouse Children
Employment Employment Employment Employment Employment Employment Employment Employment
(Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
IV Results
Homeownership IV -0.0224 0.0352 -0.0667*** -0.0830*** -0.0462* -0.0251 -0.0487*** -0.0926***
(0.0181) (0.0297) (0.0163) (0.0281) (0.0266) (0.0399) (0.0187) (0.0302)
R-squared 0.166 0.153 0.162 0.154 0.219 0.199 0.153 0.126
ITT Results
Homeownership ITT -0.0144 0.0183 -0.0405*** -0.0470*** -0.0292* -0.0154 -0.0289** -0.0534***
(0.0117) (0.0173) (0.00997) (0.0150) (0.0166) (0.0239) (0.0113) (0.0170)
R-squared 0.166 0.160 0.164 0.158 0.219 0.199 0.154 0.147
Observations 21,344 21,344 28,243 28,243 14,805 14,805 18,420 18,420
BANDWIDTH 74 74 98 98 192 192 90 90
CONTROLS NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
OFFER ROUND FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
CONTROL MEAN .367 .367 .287 .287 .453 .453 .219 .219
MEAN AGE 37.98 37.98 27.32 27.32 38.90 38.90 20.42 20.42
Notes: Data is for applicants of legal working age, four years after applying to 2010 and 2011 offer rounds. Employment is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the applicant
is working four years after applying and 0 otherwise. Head of Household is the person who submitted the application. Not Head of Household in any household member
who is not the Head of Household. Spouse is a family member who is less than fifteen years younger or older than the Head of Household. Child is a family member who
is younger than the Head of Household by fifteen years or more. Controls include gender, age, poverty level, working status before appyling, wage before applying, elderly
family member, and disabled family member. Control Mean is the mean of the corresponding outcome variable for applicants in the bandwidth who are below the cutoff
score. Standard errors are clustered at the family level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Returning to the discussion from the previous section, we conduct the anal-
ysis by gender, but restricting the age of the applicants to those who are 30 years of
age or younger. Even though the estimate becomes less precise due to the reduction
in sample size, Figure D4 and Table C4 in the appendix suggest that, if anything,
once the sample is restricted by age, female applicants seem to be more affected
than male applicants.
1.7 Potential Mechanisms
The results indicate that homeownership under this program reduces the
labor supply of those who seem to be the children of the main applicant and those
36 These authors point out that low-income families with no access to risk diversification, savings
bank accounts or insurance, must find alternative solutions. They often rely primarily on networks
and family members, and in particular, children of legal working-age can provide additional
sources of income to the household by joining the labor market. Additionally, Young children
can be seen as a type of future insurance, able to provide care or shelter for elderly relatives.
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who were not working at the time of application. In trying to explain what may be
driving these effects, we show that the mobility of applicants or the quality of the
area in which they live does not play any role. On the other hand, we show that
voucher recipients tend to have fewer children after the offer round than voucher
non-recipients; this suggests that the recipient families see less of a pressing need
for future informal insurance.
1.7.1 The Effect of the Homeownership Voucher on Residential Sta-
bility, Area Quality, and Newborns
As described in the introduction, some scholars have argued that the reduced
mobility of homeowners - the so-called lock-in effect - is a mechanism through which
homeownership could reduce employment. To test this, we use municipalities as a
proxy for a labor market;37 and estimate Equation 1.3 using as a dependent variable
a dummy indicator equal to 1 if the applicant is living in a different municipality from
the one in which they were living when applying and 0 otherwise. It is worth noting
that, in the metropolitan area (from which 45 percent of applications originate), the
average largest distance across a municipality is 5 kilometers (see Appendix Figure
D5).
The top left panel of Figure 1.9 and columns 1 and 2 of Table 1.6 provide
evidence suggesting that families who did not receive a voucher do not tend to move
to another municipality in a higher proportion than those who did receive one.
These results imply that, in our context, the reduced mobility of homeowners does
not seem to be the main mechanism driving the negative effect of homeownership
on employment. This result also provides evidence that, even in an extreme case
where homeowners are forced to remain in a fixed location for five years, renters are
still not more likely to move to a different municipality in a higher proportion.
Similar results regarding mobility were previously found in other contexts
such as those studied in Sanbonmatsu et al. (2014) and Barnhardt et al. (2017). The
authors explained these results by arguing that families place a high importance on
the social networks established in their place of residency, and that this encourages
them to stay in the same area.
The top right panel of Figure 1.9 shows no discontinuity in the poverty level
of the municipalities in which applicants live after the offer rounds. Columns 3 and
4 of Table 1.6 also do not show statistically significant results in this dimension.
Thus the quality of the area in which homeowners under this program live - and the
37 While we do not consider this to be strictly true, we believe that it provides a reasonable approx-
imation.
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Figure 1.9: The Effect of the Homeownership Voucher on Residential
Stability, Area Quality, and Newborns
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Notes: Data is for applicants of legal working age, four years after they applying
to 2010 and 2011 offer rounds. Applicant Moving to Another Municipality is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if the applicant is living in a different municipality from
the one in which they lived when applying and 0 otherwise. Municipal Poverty
level is the average poverty level of the municipality in which the applicant lives
four years after applying. Child after Applying is a dummy variable equal to 1
if the household has 1 or more children born into the family after applying and
0 otherwise. Each dot represents the mean of the corresponding outcome for the
applicants in a particular bin. The vertical line in each panel represents the cutoff
score for receiving a voucher offer. Point estimates and standard errors are from
the IV regression (Equation 1.3).
subsequent networks that they form in their new place of residence - are not likely
to drive any of the observed effects.
The bottom panel of Figure 1.9 shows that voucher recipients are less likely
to have a new child born after applying, and Table 1.6 shows this decrease to be
between 5.0 and 6.3 p.p. A plausible explanation for this result is that parents in
low-income families tend to perceive young children as a source of future informal
insurance (Field, 2003; Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2010). Homeowners under this
program thus face less of a pressing need to have more children as they receive a
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large transfer of wealth from the government, in the form of a house, which becomes
their future insurance.
Table 1.6: The Effect of the Homeownership Voucher on Residential
Stability, Area Quality, and Newborns
VARIABLES
Applicant Moving to
another Municipality
Municipal Poverty
Level
Child after
Applying
(Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IV Results
Homeownership IV -0.0172 0.00488 0.00175 0.00410 -0.0501*** -0.0633**
(0.0178) (0.0262) (0.00279) (0.00437) (0.0177) (0.0290)
R-squared 0.033 0.028 0.431 0.429 0.009 0.007
ITT Results
winnerdummy -0.0116 0.00217 0.00126 0.00238 -0.0331*** -0.0371**
(0.0112) (0.0165) (0.00176) (0.00256) (0.0111) (0.0164)
R-squared 0.032 0.033 0.432 0.432 0.012 0.012
Observations 55,953 55,953 41,672 41,672 54,693 54,693
BANDWIDTH 114 114 85 85 96 96
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES YES
OFFER ROUND FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
CONTROL MEAN .212 .212 .151 .151 .214 .214
Notes: Data is for applicants of legal working age, four years after applying to 2010 and 2011 offer rounds. Ap-
plicant Moving to Another Municipality is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the applicant is living in a different
municipality from the one in which they were living when applying and 0 otherwise. Municipal Poverty level is
the average poverty level of the municipality in which the applicant lives four years after applying. Child after Ap-
plying is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household has 1 or more children born into the family after applying
and 0 otherwise. Controls include gender, age, poverty level, elderly family member, and disabled family member.
Control Mean is the mean of the corresponding outcome variable for applicants in the bandwidth who are below
the cutoff score. Standard errors are clustered at the family level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
To summarize, the evidence presented in this section suggests that spatial
mobility and the quality of the area of residency are not driving the reduction in
employment amongst children of the family. We have also shown that voucher-
recipient households tend to have at least one new child in a lower proportion.
1.8 A Model of Household Behavior
In this section, I rationalize the results found in this paper, by modeling the
behavior of families that purchased a house and thus have ceased to incur in “rental
costs”. To this end, I present a simple variation of the model presented in Basu and
Van (1998)’s seminal work. Consider a household that has one adult (a) and one
child (c); agents can work if they wish, and have the option of either working or not
working, but have no say in the number of hours worked. Without loss of generality,
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wages of children and adults are the same, wa = wc = w, and given by the market.
38
The potential household earning is thus W = 2w. The minimum desired level of
consumption of a family that has a child in school is (1 − α)S, with 0.5 ≥ α ≥ 0.
Once the child has completed school and becomes an adult, the minimum household
level of consumption rises to S. This implies that households with a child in school
have a desired minimum level of consumption that is αS units lower than the level
once their child has left school.
In this setup, adults choose whether or not their children work. Also, adults
benefit from their own non-working time, La, and their child’s non-working time, Lc,
and are altruistic in the sense that Lc ≥ La. For simplicity, non-working time is dis-
crete, Li = {0, 1}, and total household non-working time is L = Lc+La. Household
preferences are represented by the following Stone-Geary utility function:39
U(C,E) =

(C − S)(L) if C ≥ S
(C − S) if C < S
(1.4)
subject to the budget constraint:
C = (1− L)W +R (1.5)
where C is the household consumption and R is some non-monetary good provided,
such as a house. For simplicity, assume that good provided when the household
has a student is zero, Rs = 0. The setup above implies that the household income
before the child becomes an adult can satisfy the minimum level of consumption,
0.5W ≥ (1−α)S, and that wealthier families benefit more from leisure. The house-
hold maximizes U with respect to C and L. From the first order condition, we get
the following results:
38 I believe this to be a reasonable assumption for this low-skilled income group. Results do not
change if wa ≥ wc.
39 Notice that this setup implies that: Lc = {0, 0.5L} and La{0, 0.5L}. Using a more complex form
of non-working time, where leisure for each agent is continuous rather than discrete, leads to an
interior solution where L = W+R−S
2W
. On the other hand, the amount of household non-working
time taken by each agent depends on the functional form of the utility function and the marginal
rate of substitution between parent and child non-working time. For instance, if we were to use
for the first bracket of the utility the following function: (C − S)(αLβa + (1− α)Lβc )
1
β ; if C ≥ S,
it would lead to a marginal rate of substitution La
Lc
= α
1−α .
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L =

Lc = 0 and La = 0 if 0.5W +R ≤ S
Lc = 1 and La = 0 if 0.5W ≥ S and R = 0
Lc = 1 and La = 0 if S > 0.5W ≥ (1− α)S and R ≥ αS ≥ 0
Lc = 1 and La = 1 if R ≥ S
(1.6)
The main takeaway from these results is the following: children will not work if
parents make enough money to cover the minimum level of household consumption
or if the monetary value of the goods provided is large enough to offset the increase in
minimum household consumption when a child becomes an adult, Lc = 1 and La =
0. Thus some families who, in the absence of the voucher, would push their children
to work (R = 0), see an increase in goods provided (obtaining a house and ceasing
to pay rent) and do not encourage their children to work (R ≥ αS ≥ 0).
1.9 Conclusion
The various and at times contradictory theories concerning homeownership
and its effect on employment levels mean that these concepts still face much debate.
Whilst homeownership continues to be encouraged by governments in most OECD
countries, we do not yet have a full understanding of its wider impacts on people’s
employment levels.
In this paper, we have exploited data from a Chilean government housing
program that assigns vouchers for purchasing a home with an unpredicted cutoff
point. Using a fuzzy regression discontinuity, we found that homeownership under
this program decreases employment by between 3.95 and 5.60 p.p. We further
observed that the effect comes mostly from individuals not entering the labor market,
rather than exiting it, and from household members who are likely to be the children
of the main applicant.
Regarding the mechanism at play, we observe that the reduced spatial mo-
bility and quality of the area of residency are not the main drivers of the decrease in
employment. This finding contradicts previous theoretical literature on this topic.
We also find that these families tend to have fewer newborn children. Our results
imply that new homeowner families are in less pressing need of extra sources of in-
32
come and future informal insurance; this in turn would put less pressure on current
children of legal working age to join the labor market and to have further children
themselves.
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1.A The Homeownership Assistance Act
Act 174 (Chilean National Congress, 2006), from the Ministry of Housing
and Urban Planning (MINVU, from its Spanish name “Ministerio de Vivienda y
Urbanismo”), regulates all homeownership assistance that the Chilean government
provides to the poorest 40 percent of the population.40 Chapter XV of this Act
describes the specific rules regarding the program studied in this paper, “Adquisicion´
de Vivienda Construida” (AVC).
This chapter establishes that people who wish to be considered in a given offer
round must submit their supporting documents for the application to their regional
MINVU office. The government then ensures that the basic applicant eligibility
requirements are met: 1) having had savings of at least 400 USD in a bank account
for a year; 2) belonging to the poorest 40 percent of the population; 3) having
applied to receive the voucher in only one region; and 4) that no household member
already owns a house. If the individual meets all requirements, they are provided
with a certificate of application and they then become an applicant.
The homeownership score and all that follows is carried out for applicants
and the same rules apply nationwide.
1.A.1 The Homeownership Score
In 2010, the score was calculated using the following factors:
1. Family Poverty Level: Corresponds to the difference between the underlying
household poverty score that is used to determine the 40 percent poverty level
in the population (maximum score for an application to be valid) and the
applicant’s own poverty score, divided by 10. The poverty score assigned to
the poorest person in the Chilean population is 2,042 points and the poverty
score that determines the 40 percent threshold is 11,734 points.
2. Family Group: 10 points is added for each family member accredited in the
household poverty record. If the applicant has no other accredited family mem-
bers, he/she will receive a score of zero.
3. Children in the Family: The government calculates the share of family mem-
bers accredited in the household poverty record who are 15 years of age or
younger, determined by their age in the year of the offer round. The appli-
40 Act 174 was later replaced by Act 49 (Chilean National Congress, 2011).
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cant receives 1 point for each percentage point of the share calculated in this
category.
4. Disabled Family Members: The government calculates the share of family
members accredited in the household poverty record who are disabled. The
applicant receives 1 point for each percentage point of the share calculated in
this category.
5. Elderly Family Members: The government calculates the share of family mem-
bers accredited in the household poverty record who are 60 years of age or older,
determined by their age in the year of the offer round. The applicant receives
1 point for each percentage point of the share calculated in this category.
In 2011, MINVU introduced several changes regarding the calculation of
these factors. These changes were as follows:
1. Family Group: 40 points are given for each family member accredited in the
household poverty record, excluding the main applicant. If the applicant has
no other accredited family members, he/she will no obtain extra points.
2. Children in the Family: 30 points for each family member accredited in the
household poverty record who are 5 years of age or younger, determined by
their age in the year of the offer round.
3. Young Family Members: 20 points for each family member accredited in the
household poverty record who is between 6 and 18 years of age, determined by
their age in the year of the offer round.
4. Politically Persecuted 25 points if any family member accredited in the
household poverty record is recognized as having been politically persecuted
by Pinochet’s military regime.
5. Maximum Score: The sum of all of the aforementioned scores cannot be higher
than 400 points.
In both of the years studied, the score was calculated using the sum of the
factors listed above for each offer round. The poverty level score represents around
60 percent of the total score for an average family around the cutoff.
1.A.2 The Homeownership Voucher Selection Process
The homeownership voucher selection process is determined using the fol-
lowing steps:
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1. Vouchers are assigned to applicant families strictly following the order given
by the application score, from the applicant with the highest score to the
applicant with the lowest score. In a given offer round, the regional office will
provide vouchers until the budget for this round is exhausted in the region.41
2. If two or more applicants have the same score in a particular offer round
and region, and availability of funds prohibits all from receiving a voucher,
the applicant who has the highest score in the poverty level factor will have
preference. If the tie still remains, a lottery will be conducted to determine
the recipient.
3. Once funds are exhausted, applicants who did not receive the voucher will be
removed from MINVU records. They will be able to apply in a future offer
round, but will be required to submit an entire new application.
1.A.3 Use of the Homeownership Voucher
Once the selection procedure is finished and voucher recipients have been in-
formed, the regional office has 15 days to issue a certificate accrediting their voucher
receipt. This certificate will have:
1. The name and the national ID number of the voucher recipient.
2. Date of receipt and expiration date for the voucher.
3. Region of application and value of the voucher.
The voucher must be used in the 21 months following the applicant’s notifi-
cation of the offer round results.42
Once the voucher recipient has found a house, the regional MINVU office
must “accompany” them in the buying process. Here, government officials have the
following duties:
1. Estimating the commercial price of the property.43 The price of the house set
by the seller cannot be 20 percent higher than the price given by the MINVU.
If this is the case, the transaction cannot be continued.
41 The regional budget is set the preceding year in national budget law.
42 There is only one exception to this: the MINVU regional office has the power to extend this
period only if at the 21st month the voucher recipient has a pre-signed contract with a particular
seller and for a particular property. In this case, the voucher recipient can purchase the house
referred to in the pre-signed contract or lose the voucher.
43 This pricing process is determined by Resolution N 347 from the MINVU.
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2. Confirming that the house to be purchased satisfied basic habitability require-
ments (e.g. having a solid concrete floor or potable water supply).
3. Providing advice to the voucher recipient for the legal paperwork required in
the buying process.
Once this has been completed, the voucher will cover the difference between
the market price of the house and the amount of savings accredited by the family
at the time of application, up to a maximum of 25,000 USD. The process here is as
follows: the voucher recipient, the seller and the government sign the house purchase
contract. After this, the house is transferred, the voucher recipient pays the amount
of savings reported in the application, and the government pays the remainder to
the seller.
1.A.4 Restrictions
The Act states in its restrictions that this voucher cannot be used to buy a
house from relatives up to the second degree - meaning grandparents, grandchildren,
aunts, uncles, nephews, nieces or half-siblings.
Furthermore, AVC voucher recipients are not permitted to take out a hous-
ing mortgage, nor can they sell or rent the property in the 5 years following the
announcement of offer round results. Finally, families are not permitted to use the
home as a collateral for credit for a 5 year period.
1.B The Poverty Index
The poverty index is the main criteria used by the government to deliver
social benefits, and aims to capture the “risk of a family of becoming poor”. Al-
though families may have a grasp of the broad variables used to compute the index,
the exact equation is not public knowledge. The Ministry of Planning provides the
following sketch of the poverty index equation:
2*Poverty Index =
Ability to Generate Income
+ Declared Income Permanent Income
Household Needs
where each of the terms in this equation are calculated for all family members
in the household. The government provides the following description of the variables:
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• Ability to Generate Income: Potential labor wage that each household member
could receive in the labor market. Certain household members have a potential
wage of 0 such as those of retirement age, students under 25 years of age,
pregnant women, or disabled family members. Two facts are worth noting: 1)
the equation used to input potential labor market wages is not known; and
2) factors that could ultimately increase real wages in the labor market (e.g.
further years of education) will increase these potential wages for household
members.
• Declared Income: Labor income as declared by the family. This particular
term is not checked against any official record.
These two measures are combined for all household members and used to
create one single factor where Ability to Generate Income receives 90 percent of the
weighting and Declared Income receives 10 percent. The labor income thus does
play a part in determining this index, but it is far from being its main component.
• Permanent Income: Income received from a pension and any other regular
transfers. This is self-reported, but also checked against governmental agen-
cies.
• Household Financial Needs: Financial needs associated with disabled family
members or terminal illnesses.
These two measures are also combined for all household members. The
weighting of each factor in the equation is not provided by the government.
The system is automatized and updated using administrative information.
For example, if a household member turns 65 years old or passes away, the score is
recalculated to reflect this new information. After all information has been collected,
the government computes a score for each family, where a higher score effectively
means “richer” and a lower score means “poorer”. The lowest poverty score is 2,042
points, and the two most common thresholds for obtaining social benefits are 8,500
points (poorest 20 percent) and 11,734 points (poorest 40 percent). In the process
of applying for a social benefit, families use their score and generally are aware of
the maximum scores for applying.
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1.C Tables
Table C1: Homeownership Voucher Utilization
Voucher Value (USD)
Employment ITT IV
(Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Homeownership 0.638*** 0.593*** 12,791*** 12,315*** 20,089*** 20,465***
(0.0115) (0.0169) (118.1) (179.8) (231.9) (352.3)
R-squared 0.520 0.520 0.783 0.783 0.736 0.732
Observations 47,307 47,307 50,077 50,077 50,077 50,077
BANDWIDTH 83 83 88 88 88 88
CONTROLS NO NO YES YES YES YES
OFFER ROUND FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
REGION FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Data is for applicants of legal working age, four years after applying to 2010 and 2011 offer rounds. Em-
ployment is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the applicant has ever bought a house using a homeownership voucher
since 2010 and 0 otherwise. Voucher Value is the value of the voucher executed by voucher recipients. Controls
include gender, age, poverty level, elderly family member, and disabled family member. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the family level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table C2: Homeownership Voucher Utilization by Dates After Applying
VARIABLES
6 Months after
Applying
12 Months after
Applying
18 Months after
Applying
24 Months after
Applying
(Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Homeownership 0.113*** 0.115*** 0.306*** 0.292*** 0.476*** 0.438*** 0.547*** 0.504***
(0.00816) (0.0116) (0.0104) (0.0148) (0.0108) (0.0155) (0.0113) (0.0164)
Observations 41,290 41,290 50,647 50,647 58,872 58,872 52,973 52,973
R-squared 0.123 0.123 0.257 0.257 0.386 0.386 0.443 0.444
BANDWIDTH 72 72 89 89 104 104 93 93
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
REGION FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
CONTROL MEAN 0 0 .001 .001 .005 .005 .009 .009
Notes: Data is for applicants of legal working age, four years after applying to 2010 and 2011 offer rounds. 6 Months after Applying
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the applicant used a voucher to buy a house 6 months after applying and 0 otherwise. 12 Months
after Applying is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the applicant used a voucher to buy a house 12 months after applying and 0 oth-
erwise. 18 Months after Applying is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the applicant used a voucher to buy a house 18 months after
applying and 0 otherwise. 24 Months after Applying is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the applicant used a voucher to buy a house
24 months after applying and 0 otherwise. Controls include gender, age, poverty level, elderly family member, and disabled family
member. Standard errors are clustered at the family level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table C3: Homeownership Effect on House Characteristics
VARIABLES
Living with a
Hosting Family
Rudimentary
House
Number of
Rooms used Apartment
(Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
IV Results
Homeownership IV -0.460*** -0.493*** -0.0803*** -0.0677*** 0.146*** 0.143** -0.00991 0.00344
(0.0166) (0.0265) (0.00947) (0.0161) (0.0451) (0.0702) (0.0184) (0.0302)
R-squared 0.205 0.202 0.045 0.036 0.038 0.039 0.045 0.046
F-Stat 3277 1073 3512 1166 2850 905 2249 710
ITT Results
Homeownership ITT -0.305*** -0.310*** -0.0533*** -0.0436*** 0.0967*** 0.0874** -0.00580 0.00129
(0.0122) (0.0181) (0.00641) (0.00960) (0.0285) (0.0414) (0.0114) (0.0170)
R-squared 0.123 0.124 0.036 0.036 0.038 0.039 0.045 0.045
Observations 44,652 44,652 48,315 48,315 42,959 42,959 34,273 34,273
BANDWIDTH 88 88 96 96 88 88 68 68
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
OFFER ROUND FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
CONTROL MEAN .444 .444 .084 .084 1.7 1.7 .127 .127
Notes: Data is for applicants of legal working age, four years after applying to 2010 and 2011 offer rounds. Living with a Hosting Family is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if the applicant lives in another family’s house and 0 otherwise. Rudimentary House is a dummy variable equal to
1 if the applicant live in a house without a concrete floor or potable water and 0 otherwise. Number of Rooms Used is the number of rooms
that the family use as bedrooms in the house. Apartment is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the family lives in an apartment and 0 otherwise.
Controls include gender, age, poverty level, elderly family member, and disabled family member. Standard errors are clustered at the family
level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table C4: Effect of Homeownership on Employment by Gender for
Applicants 30 Years of Age or Younger
Men Women
Employment Employment Employment Employment
(Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
IV Results
Homeownership IV -0.0333 -0.0546 -0.0725*** -0.0628**
(0.0254) (0.0451) (0.0190) (0.0303)
R-squared 0.242 0.239 0.123 0.123
ITT Results
Homeownership ITT -0.0187 -0.0291 -0.0461*** -0.0399**
(0.0152) (0.0225) (0.0122) (0.0180)
R-squared 0.243 0.243 0.124 0.124
Observations 11,730 11,730 17,299 17,299
BANDWIDTH 103 103 98 98
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES
OFFER ROUND FE YES YES YES YES
CONTROL MEAN .298 .298 .258 .258
Notes: Data is for applicants of legal working age, four years after applying to 2010 and 2011 offer
rounds. Employment is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the applicant is working four years after ap-
plying and 0 otherwise. Men is the subgroup of applicants who are men. Women is the subgroup
of applicants who are women. Controls include gender, age, poverty level, working status before ap-
plying, wage before applying, elderly family member, and disabled family member. Control Mean is
the mean of the corresponding outcome variable for applicants in the bandwidth who are below the
cutoff score. Standard errors are clustered at the family level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table C5: The Effect of the Homeownership Voucher on Employment
and Wages - Standard Errors Clustered at the Municipal Level
Employment Employment Wage USD Wage USD
(Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
IV Results
Homeownership IV -0.0560*** -0.0395** -42.96*** -14.06
(0.0126) (0.0202) (13.09) (20.06)
R-squared 0.161 0.161 0.213 0.212
ITT Results
Homeownership ITT -0.0359*** -0.0244** -27.24*** -9.009
(0.00799) (0.0116) (8.24) (12.22)
R-squared 0.164 0.164 0.215 0.215
Observations 55,916 55,916 48,292 48,292
BANDWIDTH 98 98 85 85
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES
OFFER ROUND FE YES YES YES YES
CONTROL MEAN .325 .325 251.56 251.56
Notes: Data is for applicants of legal working age, four years after applying to 2010 and 2011
offer rounds. Employment is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the applicant is working four years
after applying and 0 otherwise. Wage USD is the applicant’s observed wage four years after ap-
plying. Controls include gender, age, poverty level, elderly family member, disabled family mem-
ber, employment status before applying and wage before applying. Control Mean is the mean
of the corresponding outcome variable for applicants in the bandwidth who are below the cutoff
score. Standard errors are clustered at the Municipal level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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1.D Graphs
Figure D1: Age Distribution of Applicants by Gender
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Figure D2: Effect of Homeownership at Different Bandwidths
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Notes: Data is for applicants of legal working age, four years after applying to 2010
and 2011 offer rounds. Each dot represents the point estimate of a regression dis-
continuity using the sample in the bandwidth. The confidence intervals are set at
95% confidence. Controls include gender, age, poverty level, working status before
applying, wage before applying, elderly family member, and disabled family mem-
ber. Standard errors are clustered at the family level. Point estimates and standard
errors are from the IV regression (Equation 1.3).
Figure D3: Effect of Homeownership Voucher on Employment by Age
Group
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Notes: Data is for applicants of legal working age, four years after applying to 2010
and 2011 offer rounds. We use as an outcome variable a dummy of 1 if the applicant
is employed and 0 otherwise. Each dot represents the point estimate of the local lin-
ear regression (as in Equation 3) in a bandwidth around the cutoff for applicants who
were in each age group four years after applying. The confidence intervals are calcu-
lated at a 95% confidence level. Controls include gender, age, poverty level, working
status before applying, wage before applying, elderly family member, and disabled
family member. Standard errors are clustered at the family level. Point estimates
and standard errors are from the IV regression (Equation 1.3).
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Figure D4: Effect of Homeownership on Employment by Gender for
Applicants 30 Years of Age or Younger
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Notes: Data is for applicants of legal working age who are 30 years of age or
younger, four years after applying to 2010 and 2011 offer rounds. Employment is
a dummy variable equal to 1 if the applicant is working four years after applying
and 0 otherwise. Men is the subgroup of applicants who are men. Women is
the subgroup of applicants who are women. Each dot represents the mean of
Employment for the applicants in a particular bin. The vertical line in each panel
represents the cutoff score for receiving a voucher offer. Point estimates and
standard errors are from the IV regression (Equation 1.3).
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Figure D5: Greater Santiago Metropolitan Area
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Chapter 2
Homeownership and Human
Capital: Evidence from Chile.
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2.1 Introduction
In 2014 alone, the US government assisted American families with 50 billion
USD worth of homeownership plans for low-income families, of which 18 billion
were provided as portable vouchers that recipients used to purchase a house in the
private market.1 The government of Chile contributed approximately 10 billion USD
towards the same ends, with 1.2 billion being used as portable vouchers.2 These
governmental efforts to promote homeownership rely on the strong belief that owning
a house has a positive impact on families. One of the most commonly cited of these
impacts is an improvement in the educational development of children (Department
of Housing and Urban Development, 2000).3
There has however been a lack of settings in which homeownership has been
as good as randomly assigned, which has prevented economic scholars from estab-
lishing the causal impact of owning a house on student learning. Panel studies
have often found that homeownership has large positive effects on academic results
(Boehm and Schlottmann, 1999; Green and White, 1997; Mohanty and Raut, 2009;
Harkness and Newman, 2002; Haurin et al., 2002). The biggest concern in these
studies is the endogeneity of homeownership and its likely correlation with other
mediating factors. Some studies have attempted to remove omitted variables such
as health or wealth, which are presumably positively correlated with homeowner-
ship, in turn finding much smaller effects (Aaronson, 2000; Ma’rof and Redzuan,
2012). The only study of which I am aware that finds no effects of homeownership
on students’ academic outcomes is Barker and Miller (2009), and I am not aware of
any study that has established negative effects.
In this study, I exploit a homeownership program in which families apply
to receive a voucher to assist them with the purchase of a house.4 To select the
voucher recipients, the Chilean government ranks applicant families and assigns as
many vouchers as the budget permits. This method creates an arbitrary cut-off
point. Among households just above the cut-off point, 63% redeem their voucher
and buy a house. I use a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, using data drawn from
this voucher system, to study the effects of homeownership on the learning outcomes
for school-age children (henceforth referred to as students) who come from families
that applied for the voucher.5 These effects are measured three years after parents
1 https://www.cbo.gov/publication/50782
2 http://www.dipres.gob.cl/572/articles-72441_doc_pdf.pdf
3 http://archives.hud.gov/news/2000/pr00-132.html
4 This is the same program used in Navarrete and Navarrete (2016) to explore the effect of home-
ownership on employment.
5 School age in Chile goes from the ages of 6 to 17.
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applied for the voucher.
I first analyze the effect of homeownership on student learning across the
whole sample, and by gender. Then, I analyze students in elementary school (1st
to 4th grades), where students have only one teacher. Finally, I analyze students
in middle school and high school (5th to 12th grades), where students have several
teachers according to the subject.
Across the whole sample and by gender, I do not find significant effects of
homeownership on students’ test scores. However, in the sample of students in
elementary school, I find a significantly negative effect on students’ reading scores
of by between 0.16 and 0.18 standard deviations (σ). In a further analysis, I show
that the significant results do not hold in mathematics most likely because 2nd
graders - the most strongly affected group of elementary students - do not take the
mathematics test.
When exploring potential mechanisms, I find that homeownership decreases
the probability of living with a hosting family by between 12 and 20 percentage
points (p.p.) for students in elementary school. This effect arises most likely from
families that were previously living in another family’s house and have made the
transition to their own house. The drop in the likelihood of living with a hosting
family might lead to a reduction in students’ academic achievements due to the loss
of learning support provided by members of the hosting family, who are often close
relatives (CASEN, 2013).6,7
I also observe that homeownership increases the probability of living in a non-
rudimentary house - meaning a house with a concrete floor, an indoor bathroom,
and access to potable water. However, these improvements do not seem to improve
students’ test scores.
Results found in this paper are consistent with recent literature studying
similar programs, such as Moving to Opportunities, which show that the age of
exposure is an important driver of the effects (Chetty et al., 2016).8 Chetty and
his coauthors’ results also suggest that the lack of effects across the entire sample
seem to be the result of no effects on older students and strong effects on younger
students. A similarly pattern is observed in this paper.
6 The probability of living with a hosting family does also decrease for students in middle and high
school, but do not seem to impact test scores.
7 The importance of learning support at younger ages and from outside the immediate family has
also been documented by Newport (1990); Charles and Piazza (2009).
8 The Moving to Opportunities program randomly assigned vouchers to families to assist them with
rental costs. In the experimental section of the program, families were required to use the voucher
in a neighborhood with a lower measurement of poverty in census data. In the non-experimental
section of the program, no restrictions were imposed on families.
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This paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. This is
the first paper to use a quasi-experimental design to measure the impact of home-
ownership on student learning. Further to this, I present evidence suggesting that
transitions in housing status from living with a hosting family to owning a house
have a negative impact on students’ academic outcomes, a result that seems to arise
from the loss of learning support provided by close family members. Third, my
results may point to a broader conclusion that the loss of additional non-parental
care tends to have an inherently negative impact on young students’ learning.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section I discuss the be-
havioral mechanisms through which this program might affect student’s outcomes.
Section 2.3 presents the voucher-based housing program and the educational con-
text in Chile. Section 2.4 then provides an overview of the data used in this paper.
Section 2.5 presents the empirical strategy of the paper. In Section 2.6, I discuss the
regression discontinuity validity in further depth. Section 2.7 presents the results,
Section 2.8 presents the potential mechanisms, and Section 2.9 concludes.
2.2 Previous Evidence
Several scholars have debated the potential effects of homeownership incen-
tives on educational outcomes. The program under analysis in this paper provides an
opportunity to study some aspects of these effects. First, this program may carry a
wealth-income effect. The value of a voucher represents several years’ worth of wages
for recipient families (as established in the previous chapter, and discussed further
later in this chapter), and these new homeowner families no longer have the need to
pay rent (see Sections 1.2). This might encourage parents to invest more heavily in
their children’s education, for example through opting for more expensive schools or
enrolling them in supplementary classes, which could boost students’ learning levels.
Second, the housing tenure status alone may have an effect. If voucher recipients are
more likely to become homeowners, their perception of themselves (e.g. self-esteem)
could potentially improve through this “achievement”. An increase in self-esteem
could then be passed on to students, leading to improvements in their educational
outcomes. Third, given the design of the program under study, the conditions of the
houses in which these new homeowners now reside may improve, which in turn could
increase health outcomes. Improved health conditions can foster learning through
several channels, such as increasing school attendance. Fourth, the quality of the
area in which students reside might improve (or worsen), which could have an effect
on the local networks and services to which these students have access. By being
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influenced by more highly achieving peers and improved services, educational out-
comes could increase. Fifth, at the moment of application some families lived with
a hosting family (e.g. grandparents’ house). By design, this program moves these
families into independent living, which might reduce the total level of care received
by students, given that there are fewer adults at home, and therefore may decrease
their learning outcomes.
In theory, an increase in income might motivate families to invest more in
their children’s education.9 Dahl and Lochner (2012) exploits non-linear changes in
income from the Earned Income Tax Credit, and finds that a 1,000 USD increase
in income raises mathematics test scores by 2.1 percent and reading test scores by
3.6 percent of a standard deviation. Currie and Yelowitz (2000) attempt to isolate
the effects of income on educational outcomes by exploiting a housing assistance
program that provides rental subsidies to families. They also found a complementary
relationship between income and educational outcomes.
Theoretically, obtaining a house could increase the levels of confidence and
self-esteem of homeowners, as they perceive themselves as being more able to “achieve”
outcomes from within the system (Dietz and Haurin, 2003). These perceptions could
in turn be passed on to household members, increasing outcomes for other family
members, including educational outcomes for students. Empirical correlational stud-
ies have found some evidence supporting this claim by showing that homeowners
have higher levels of self-esteem, confidence, life satisfaction, and happiness, when
compared with households in other living arrangements (Balfour and Smith, 1996;
Rakoff, 1977; Rossi and Weber, 1996; Rohe and Stegman, 1994). It thus seems
plausible that these changes in housing tenure could have an effect on parental
self-perception, and so the effect of this on student outcomes is worth exploring in
further depth.
The perception of local networks, from homeowner families, might also affect
students’ outcomes. First, homeowner families might be more willing to establish
strong relationships with their neighbors, given that they have committed for a
long period of time to their local area. DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) propose this
theory, and in the empirical section of their paper, their hypothesis is supported
by the data. Building on this, Green and White (1997) argue that, given that
homeowner families invest more seriously in social capital, they place value on their
children acting appropriately within these networks, which in turn might motivate
9 There are other ways in which income could be related to educational level. For example, parents
from low economic backgrounds have shown low levels of mathematics and literacy skills. I do
not believe that these other ways in which permanent low levels of income affect educational
outcomes are at play in this context.
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improved parental practices and increased time spent with children. Although their
paper does not have the data to fully address this concept, their suggestive analysis
seems to support their hypothesis.
By design, this program mechanically moves all new homeowner families
into houses that are above the minimum conditions of living standards, which could
yield increases in health factors.10 The effect of housing conditions on health has
been largely addressed in empirical literature (Krieger and Higgins, 2002; Martin
et al., 1987; Haurin et al., 2002). Authors have pointed out that improved housing
conditions decrease the probability that children will develop respiratory infections,
asthma, mental health problems, and acute sicknesses that keep them housebound.
Later studies have established that the prevalence of the aforementioned illnesses
has a detrimental impact on educational outcomes (Coffman et al., 2008; Cabana
et al., 2014).
It has long been argued that residing in a particular neighborhood can have
effects on family and student outcomes. This has been explained using residential
sorting models - wealthy (poor) citizens tend to live in wealthy (poor) areas - which
suggest that those who do not take into account the effects of their local peers
and services might have worse outcomes.11 This has inspired a growing body of
literature, of which the best known experiment is Moving to Opportunities (MTO),
where families received a voucher that allowed them to rent a house in a wealthier
neighborhood than their current area (Kling et al., 2007). Authors in this study
found indistinguishable effects on student learning, which was essentially driven by
a zero sum effect between: 1) a positive effect on young women and 2) a negative
effect on young men. In a later study, Chetty et al. (2016) re-analyzed MTO using
the age of exposure as the relevant factor for the treatment effect. They show that
those who where exposed at a young age (less than 13 years old) were positively
affected, while those who where exposed at older ages (from 13 to 18 years old)
were negatively affected. Another recognized study is that of Oreopoulos (2003).
He used as a source of exogenous variation the allocation of public projects into
different types of neighborhoods. He also finds little evidence of the effect of the
neighborhoods on student learning.
Close relatives, such as grandparents, can complement the support provided
by parents to students (Baydar and Brooks-Gunn, 1991; Kontos et al., 1995). New
10 Recall that the MINVU verifies that the houses bought using the voucher have potable water, a
concrete floor and an indoor bathroom.
11 Another mechanism through which a neighborhood might affect students is that neighborhoods
with a higher share of homeowners could potentially have characteristics that are conducive to
creating better students. I do not believe that this program dramatically changes the share of
homeowners in different areas, so this mechanism does not seem plausible.
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homeowner families under this program who were previously living in the house
of a close relative mechanically alter their living arrangement and start living in-
dependently. This could decrease the complementary care that the hosting family
provides to children, which in turn could have an effect on students’ learning out-
comes. A large body of studies has documented the importance of supplementary
care on learning outcomes (Currie and Almond, 2011; Aassve et al., 2012; Arpino
et al., 2010).
The discussion presented suggests that: 1) there is a relationship between
income and student learning; 2) the relationship between homeownership status
and self-perception seems plausible, and its connection to students’ outcomes seems
to be worth exploring; 3) the effects of housing conditions on health status, and
the consequential effects of this on education, seem well documented; 4) the effect
of neighborhood quality on students seems to be ambiguous; and 5) the lost of
supplementary care might be an important mechanism at play in this context.
2.3 The Homeownership Program and the Chilean
Educational System
This is the same program as described in 1.2. Some things that the reader
should keep in mind are:
• Families must submit a new application for a homeownership voucher each
time the government launches a new offer round. In the application process,
families must select a region of application.
• The number of applicants far exceeds the number of vouchers offered.
• Applicants are ranked based on a score that is determined using their level of
poverty and several household characteristics.
• The government delivers as many voucher as the budget permits in each region,
strictly following the ranking.
• I use data from the 2010 and 2011 AVC offer rounds.
2.3.1 The Chilean Educational System
Over the course of an educational life, students pass through three differ-
ent stages of instruction, each with its own common teaching techniques, grading
standards, and often confined within its own physical building. The first stage lasts
57
from 1st to 4th grades, and is characterized by students having a single teacher for
all subjects (henceforth referred to as elementary school). The second stage is from
5th to 8th grades (henceforth referred to as middle school) and the third is from
9th through 12th grades (henceforth referred to as high school). In both middle and
high school, students have a different teacher for each subject. The most significant
difference between the latter two is that only grades in high school count towards
university entrance rankings.
2.4 Data
2.4.1 Heads of Families and Family Group Datasets
This chapter uses as its main dataset the one described in Section 1.3.1.
Some things that the reader should keep in mind are:
• This dataset contains all heads of households, and their household members,
who applied to the voucher offer rounds in 2010 and 2011.
• Cutoff scores from every offer round and region are centered to zero. All offer
rounds are then pooled.
• Standard errors are clustered at the family level throughout the analysis, as
outcomes are likely to be correlated at this level.
2.4.2 Student Learning
To explore students’ academic outcomes, I use results from the Chilean na-
tional education test. Given that 2014 is the most recent year for which I have access
to test scores, the latest point in time at which I can measure students’ academic
achievement is three years after their families applied to the housing voucher. This
means that I use 2013 test score results for students in the 2010 voucher offer round,
and 2014 results for students in the 2011 round.
Since 2013, this test has taken place in 2nd, 4th, 6th, 8th, and 10th grades.
All of these grades take the reading test, and all but 2nd-graders take the math-
ematics test.12 In the final dataset, I use reading and mathematics test score re-
sults, measured in standard deviations, for the aforementioned grades. I merge this
student learning dataset with the previous one using the student ID and year. I
12 There are tests in other subjects, but these tests do not take place in every grade and in every
year.
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successfully merge 39,443 students using test result data taken three years after a
given family applied for the housing voucher.
The way in which this dataset is constructed keeps the time span of applica-
tion constant, and ensures that all students have had at least one year of exposure
to the new house when test scores are measured.13 Moreover, it avoids sample
composition bias by keeping constant the compositions of grades taking the test.14
2.4.3 Mobility, Questionnaires, and House Conditions
I construct this dataset gathering information from several sources. The
following data are measured three years after families submitted their application
for the housing voucher.
First, I use the student enrolment dataset to identify the school attended by
each student, their town of residency, and their gender and date of birth. I then
merge this dataset with the previous sources using the student ID and year.
Using the test score and the enrolment datasets, I go on to create a dataset
measuring the ‘quality’ of each school, by first taking the test results of all school-age
children in Chile, then removing the voucher applicants from this group, and finally
computing the average test score results of the school. I link this dataset with the
ones mentioned earlier using the school ID and year.
I use responses taken from a student questionnaire, which is completed on the
day that students take the test. Among other things, this questionnaire intends to
measure students’ self-esteem, using questions such as “How strongly do you agree
with the following statement: I am smart?”. It also intends to measure parental
engagement in student learning using questions such as “How well do you think that
your parents know your grades?”.15 I use a questionnaire for parents to measure
parental expectation towards their children, using the question “What is the highest
educational level that you think your child will reach?”.16 I then standardize each
measure by grade and year, leaving the mean at zero and the standard deviation
at 1. I merge this source with previous datasets using student ID and the year in
which a given student took the test.17
The Ministry of Housing also provided variables that allow me to establish
the number of rooms in the house of residence, the number of children born since the
13 As explained in Section 1.2, families are given two years to use their voucher.
14 A complete detail of grades taking the test over the years is in Table B1 in the Appendix.
15 Second-grade students do not respond to the questionnaire.
16 A complete set of questions used in this paper can be found in Appendix 2.A.
17 Unsurprisingly, the questionnaire is voluntary; I thus will address potential differential non-
responses in the questionnaire in Section 2.6.3.
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offer, whether the applicant lives with a hosting family, and whether the family lives
in a non-rudimentary house - defined as a house with a concrete floor, an indoor
bathroom, and access to potable water - three years after applying for the voucher.
By using the head of household ID, I successfully merge all but 4 students from this
dataset with previous datasets.
2.4.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Sample Non-Recipients Recipients Voucher users Voucher non-users
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Age 11.378 11.378 11.372 11.361 11.378
(2.894) (2.904) (2.826) (2.829) (2.825)
Female 0.500 0.497 0.520 0.519 0.522
(0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500)
Disabled Family Member 0.017 0.015 0.000 0.033 0.025
(0.131) (0.124) (0.170) (0.188) (0.158)
Elderly Family Member 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03
(0.037) (0.037) (0.034) (0.038) (0.031)
Vulnerability 9.193 9.625 6.266 6.778 5.967
(5.489) (5.426) (4.995) (4.818) (5.073)
Metropolitan Area 0.314 0.315 0.304 0.290 0.312
(0.464) (0.465) (0.460) (0.454) (0.463)
2010 Offer Round 0.433 0.436 0.414 0.358 0.447
(0.496) (0.496) (0.493) (0.479) (0.497)
Voucher Value (USD) 16197
(2959)
Observations 39443 34367 5076 1874 3202
Notes: Data are for students who took the standardized test three years after the offer rounds.
The unit of observation is one student. Age is measured in years. Female is the share of students
who are female. Disabled Family Member is the share of students in families that have a family
member with a handicap. Elderly Family Member is the share of students in families whose have
an elderly family member. Vulnerability is the average percentile of vulnerability for families
containing a student, with respect to the Chilean population. Metropolitan Area is the share
of students that come from a family applying in the Santiago Metropolitan Region. 2010 Offer
Round is the share of students in the sample that come from a family that applied in the 2010
offer round. Voucher Value is the average face value of the executed voucher in US dollars.
Table 2.1 presents the descriptive statistics for students in the sample at the
moment of application. This Table shows that the mean age for these students
is between 11 and 12 years old. In this sample there is no imbalance between
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genders; however, families that received vouchers contain a slightly higher proportion
of female students than non-recipients families. This is surprising, given that the
students’ gender does not factor into the poverty index or the score used to determine
voucher recipients. Furthermore, as with the previous chapter, students living in
families with a disabled or an elderly family member constitute a small percentage
of every group.
The fifth variable of Table 2.1 shows the average percentile in the poverty
distribution, relative to the Chilean population, for applicant families with a student
in each group. Applicant families containing a student are on average in the poorest
9th decile of families in the population. Students coming from families that received
a voucher are on average in the poorest 6th decile of families in the Chilean pop-
ulation. These numbers contrasts with those presented in the previous chapter by
showing that families containing a student are poorer than those with an applicant
of legal working age. This is unsurprising given that the Chilean government con-
structs the poverty index using the expected salary of all household members, and
family members who are students under 25 years of age are assigned an expected
salary of zero. Thus, households with students will have a lower average expected
income (for a full description of how the poverty index is calculated, see Appendix
1.B).
The average value of a voucher given across this sample is 16,197 USD, which
is similar to the number presented in the previous section. As with the previous
chapter, the value of a voucher represents around 12 years’ worth of wages for the
average voucher recipient family at this poverty level (CASEN, 2013).
2.5 Program Take-Up and Empirical Strategy
2.5.1 Program Take-up
Using the particular subgroup of applicant families containing a student, I
will address in this section whether voucher-recipient families, in this particular
sample, are more likely to buy a house using the voucher than those who did not
receive an offer. To do this, I estimate the following equation:
Homeownershipi,g,r,c,t = α0 + γr,c + ςg + α1f (Scorei,r,g,c) + βDi,g,r,c
+ α2Di,g,r,c ∗ f (Scorei,g,r,c) +ϕX + ei,g,r,c,t
(2.1)
where ςg is a fixed effect for school grade, and X is a vector of controls
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Figure 2.1: First Stage
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Notes: Data are for students who took the standardized test three years after
the offer rounds. The unit of observation is one person. Each dot represents the
share of students in a particular bin that come from a family that purchased a
house using the voucher. Benchmark bandwidth estimated using the procedure
proposed by Calonico et al. (2014).
containing family characteristics including the poverty level, whether the family
has a disabled family member, whether the family has an elderly family member,
gender, and the age of student i, in grade g, in region of application r, and offer
round c. The remaining terms are described as in Section 1.4.1. As was the case in
previous chapter: 1) this study examines the robustness of different functional forms
of Scorei,g,r,c, using f ( ), which is estimated separately on either side of the cut-off;
and 2) the optimal bandwidth around the cutoff is estimated using the method
proposed by Calonico et al. (2014). The coefficient of interest is β, which estimates
the differential likelihood of buying a house using the voucher at the cutoff score.
Graph 2.1 shows that receiving a voucher offer increases the probability of
becoming a homeowner under this program by around 63%.18 This point estimate is
slightly higher than that found in the previous chapter, which might reflect families
with a student being more eager to purchase a house using their voucher.
As previously, this graph also shows: 1) some applicants who are below the
cutoff point who used the voucher; and 2) some families who have a student and are
18 As previously, the point estimate does not vary substantially if I control for Scorei,g,r,c with
polynomials of order 1 or order 2. See Table B2 in the appendix.
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above the cutoff that did not redeem their voucher. Explanations for these figures
were provided in Section 1.5.1.
2.5.2 Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity
To estimate the causal effect of homeownership under this program on stu-
dent learning and other outcomes of interest, I perform the following equation:
Outcomei,g,r,c,t = δ0 + εr,c + ςg + δ1f (Scorei,g,r,c) + δ2Di,g,r,c ∗ f (Scorei,g,r,c)
+ βLATEHomeownershipi,g,r,c,t + ρX + ei,g,r,c,t
(2.2)
where Outcomei,r,c,g,t is the outcome of interest for student i, region of applica-
tion r, offer round c, in grade g, and at time t. In this equation, I instrument
Homeownershipi,g,r,c,t using the first stage equation (Equation 2.1). Then, βLATE
captures the effect of homeownership on students around the cutoff. From this point
onwards, the results and interpretations are based on βLATE .
2.6 Regression Discontinuity Validity
In this section I conduct the validity checks performed in the previous chap-
ter, but for the sub-sample used in this chapter. Students on either side of the
cutoff must be locally comparable, in order to interpret the results as the causal
effect of owning a house on students’ outcomes. On top of this, tests and surveys
are voluntary; I show that the treatment does not have any effect on the probability
of taking part in them.
2.6.1 McCrary Test
Here, I show that the mass of students around the cutoff does not change
discontinuously, meaning that families are not able to manipulate the score to be
just above the cutoff (McCrary, 2008).
Figure 2.2 shows no discontinuity around the cutoff in the number of students.
The formal test rejects the manipulation of the score with a t-stat of -0.9754 and a
p-value of 0.3294. This piece of evidence suggests that the score is not manipulated,
so families cannot decide to be above the cutoff score.
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Figure 2.2: McCrary Test
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Notes: Data are for students who took the standardized test three years after
the offer rounds. Each circle represents the share of students in a particular
bin. The unit of observation is one student.
2.6.2 Balance Tests
To show that the group of students in families who only just miss out on a
voucher offer are locally comparable to the group of students in families who only
just receive the voucher, I estimate Equation 2.2 using as an outcome variable one
of the pre-determined covariates mentioned in Section 2.4.
Figure 2.3 suggests that the two groups are locally comparable, as it shows
no discontinuity in its panels. Table 2.2 confirms these results and shows formally
that none of the point estimates are significant. This suggests that students in
families that only just miss out on a voucher serve as a good counterfactual to those
in families who only just received a voucher.
2.6.3 Test And Questionnaire Response Rate
Mimicking the analysis used in randomized control trials, I check whether
the treatment has produced some variation in the likelihood of observing a student
below and above the cut-off in any of the questionnaires and tests mentioned in
Sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3. Figure 2.4 shows no discontinuity in any of the panels
and Table 2.3 shows no differential response rate between the treatment and control
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Figure 2.3: Continuity of Covariates Around the Threshold
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Notes: Data are for students who took the standardized test three years
after the offer rounds. The unit of observation is one student. Each dot
represents the mean of students for the corresponding pre-determined co-
variates in a particular bin. Age is measured in years. Female is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the student is a female and 0 otherwise. Disabled Fam-
ily Member is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the student is in a family that
has a disabled family member. Elderly Family Member is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the student is in a family that has an elderly family member.
Vulnerability is the percentile of vulnerability for the student’s family with
respect to the Chilean population. Benchmark bandwidth estimated using
the procedure proposed by Calonico et al. (2014).
groups for all questionnaires and tests. As a note, the lower response rates for the
mathematics test and student questionnaires are due to the fact that students in
2nd grade do not participate in either of these.
This piece of evidence implies that the results presented below are not biased
by a differential likelihood of observing a student, in one particular side of the cut-off,
for the questionnaire or tests.
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Table 2.2: Balance Test
Age Female Disabled Family Member Elderly Family Member Poverty Level
(Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Homeownership LATE 0.0152 -0.0163 0.0316 0.0347 -0.00828 -0.00482 -0.00301 0.000726 0.0194 -0.297
(0.0345) (0.0531) (0.0213) (0.0303) (0.00852) (0.0126) (0.00216) (0.00335) (0.151) (0.238)
Observations 18,709 18,709 23,049 23,049 18,814 18,814 14,966 14,966 10,868 10,868
BANDWIDTH 159 159 204 204 160 160 122 122 88 88
GRADE FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
OFFER ROUND FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
REGION FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Data are for students who took the standardized test three years after the offer rounds. The unit of observation is one student.
Age is measured in years. emphFemale is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the student is a female and 0 otherwise. Disabled Family
Member is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the student is in a family that has a disabled family member. Elderly Family Member
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the student is in a family that has an elderly family member. Vulnerability is the percentile of
vulnerability for the student’s family with respect to the Chilean population. Benchmark bandwidth estimated using the procedure
proposed by Calonico et al. (2014). Standard errors are clustered at the family level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Figure 2.4: Continuity of the Share of Students Responding to Tests
and Questionnaires Around the Threshold
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Notes: Data are for students who took the standardized test three years
after the offer rounds. The unit of observation is one student. Each dot
represents the mean of the outcome in a particular bin. Mathematics Test
is a dummy equal to 1 if a student took the mathematics test and 0 if
he/she did not. Reading Test is a dummy equal to 1 if a student took the
reading test and 0 if he/she did not. Student Questionnaire is a dummy
equal to 1 if a student answered the questionnaire and 0 if he/she did not.
Parent Questionnaire is a dummy equal to 1 if a student’s parent answered
the questionnaire and 0 if he/she did not. Bandwidth estimated using the
procedure proposed by Calonico et al. (2014).
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Table 2.3: Test and Questionnaire Response Rate
Student Quest. Parent Quest. Math. Test Reading Test
(Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Homeownership LATE 0.00989 0.00315 0.0113 0.0330 -0.0105 -0.0146 0.0120 0.00924
(0.00998) (0.0152) (0.0154) (0.0222) (0.00707) (0.0113) (0.00789) (0.0118)
Observations 16,952 16,952 23,465 23,465 17,810 17,810 16,938 16,938
BANDWIDTH 141 141 209 209 150 150 141 141
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
GRADE FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
OFFER ROUND FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
REGION FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Data are for students who took the standardized test three years after the offer rounds. The unit
of observation is one student. Mathematics Test is a dummy equal to 1 if a student took the mathematics
test and 0 if he/she did not. Reading Test is a dummy equal to 1 if a student took the reading test and
0 if he/she did not. Student Quest. is a dummy equal to 1 if a student answered the questionnaire and 0
if he/she did not. Parent Quest. is a dummy equal to 1 if a student’s parent answered the questionnaire
and 0 if he/she did not. Bandwidth estimated using the procedure proposed by Calonico et al. (2014). ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
2.7 Overall Results
In this section, I explore whether homeownership has an effect on students’
learning results based on reading and mathematics test scores. I start by measuring
the effect of homeownership over the whole sample. Then, I measure the effect sepa-
rating by gender. Finally, I measure the effects separating for students in elementary
school and in middle to high school.
Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6 do not show a clear discontinuity in reading and
mathematics test scores for the whole sample of students (top left panel), nor for
male students (top right panel), nor for female students (middle left panel). The
reading results are confirmed in Panel A of Table 2.4 (columns 1 to 6), where I find
no statistically significant results for any of these three groups. Panel B shows some
significant results in mathematics - for the whole sample and for female students in
the quadratic form - however, none of these results are robust in all specifications;
thus, I am unable to draw any conclusions. Results here seem to suggest that
homeownership does not have an effect on students’ test scores when considering
the entire sample, nor when analyzing by gender.
Looking at the third group analyzed - students in elementary school and
students in middle to high school - Figure 2.5 shows a clear discontinuity for the
younger students (bottom panel), but not for older students (middle right panel).
Table 2.4 confirms these results by showing a statistically significant result for stu-
dents in elementary school (columns 9 and 10, panel A) and a non-statistically
significant result for students in middle to high school (columns 7 and 8, Panel A).
67
The evidence presented suggests that homeownership decreases reading test scores
for students in elementary school by between 0.162σ and 0.183σ. Moreover, Figure
2.6 does not show a clear discontinuity for mathematics results in either subgroup,
which is confirmed in panel B of Table 2.4 (columns 7 to 10).
It may seem surprising that results for students in elementary school are
significant and robust in reading but not in mathematics. As mentioned in Section
2.4.2, children in 2nd grade, who are the youngest students in the sample, do not
take the mathematics test. If homeownership has a stronger effect at younger ages,
the absence of 2nd graders in mathematics may be the cause of the differing re-
sults between the two subjects. Figure C2 in the appendix separates the effect of
homeownership on students’ test score by grade and by subject. This figure shows
a similar distribution of point estimates between the two subjects. The results for
reading (upper panel) also show that 2nd graders seem to be the group that is most
strongly affected by homeownership, which might explain the differential results
between the two subjects.
My results are consistent with recent evidence showing the importance of the
age of exposure in similar programs such as Moving to Opportunities (Chetty et al.,
2016). As in my study, Chetty and his coauthors also show that the lack of effects
across the entire sample can mask strong effects on younger students.
In summary, the evidence presented in this section suggests that homeown-
ership has a causal negative effect on learning for students in elementary school.
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Figure 2.5: Discontinuity Around the Threshold - Reading
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Notes: Data are for students who took the standardized test three years
after the offer rounds. The unit of observation is one student. Each dot
represents the mean of students for the reading test score in a particular
bin. Reading test score is measured in standard deviation. Bandwidth
estimated using the procedure proposed by Calonico et al. (2014).
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Figure 2.6: Discontinuity Around the Threshold - Mathematics
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Notes: Data are for students who took the standardized test three years
after the offer rounds. The unit of observation is one student. Each dot rep-
resents the mean of students for the mathematics test score in a particular
bin. Mathematics test score is measured in standard deviation. Bandwidth
estimated using the procedure proposed by Calonico et al. (2014).
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Table 2.4: Effect of Homeownership on Student Learning
Sample Male Female Mid + High School. Elementary School.
(Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A: Reading Outcomes
Homeownership LATE -0.0270 -0.0322 -0.0392 0.0244 -0.0260 -0.0325 0.0963 0.145 -0.162*** -0.183*
(0.0468) (0.0747) (0.0619) (0.0908) (0.0621) (0.0924) (0.0606) (0.0892) (0.0621) (0.0950)
Observations 19,218 19,218 10,920 10,920 9,927 9,927 10,693 10,693 10,334 10,334
BANDWIDTH 170 170 201 201 175 175 174 174 209 209
Panel B: Mathematics Outcomes
Homeownership LATE -0.0104 -0.144* 0.0320 0.0666 -0.0829 -0.250** 0.00210 -0.0882 -0.0610 -0.281*
(0.0517) (0.0805) (0.0691) (0.103) (0.0697) (0.110) (0.0610) (0.0967) (0.0871) (0.151)
Observations 14,140 14,140 8,047 8,047 7,013 7,013 9,496 9,496 4,638 4,638
BANDWIDTH 162 162 192 192 158 158 150 150 196 196
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
GRADE FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
OFFER ROUND FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
REGION FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Data are students who took the standardized test three years after the offer rounds. The unit of observation is one student. Panel
A Provides the results for reading test scores and Panel B for mathematics test scores. Sample provides the results for all school-age
students. Male provides the results for all male school-age students. Female provides the results for all female school-age students.
Mid + High School provides the results for all students above fourth grade. Elementary School provides the results for all students in
fourth grade or lower. Test score results are measured in standard deviations. Bandwidth estimated using the procedure proposed by
Calonico et al. (2014). Standard errors are clustered at the family level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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2.8 Potential Mechanisms
In the final part of the analysis I search for possible mechanisms to explain
the effects found in the previous sections. Since I found an effect only on elementary
school students, I focus on this particular subsample in this section. However, results
for the whole sample are reported in Figure C3 and Table B3, and for students in
middle to high school in Figure C4 and Table B4 in the Appendix.19
Figure 2.7 illustrates the discontinuities for the variables described in Section
2.4.3 for students in elementary school, and shows that the greatest discontinuities
exist for the variables measuring whether families live with a hosting family and
whether they live in a non-rudimentary house (a house with a concrete floor, an
indoor bathroom, and access to potable water).
Table 2.5 shows that homeownership decreases the share of families living
with a hosting family by between 12 p.p. and 20 p.p. (Panel A, Columns 1 and
2). This effect arises most likely from families that were previously living in another
family’s house and have made the transition to their own house, and should not
affect families who were already living on their own at the time of application.
The most likely link between the decrease in the likelihood of living with a hosting
family and students’ academic outcomes is the loss of learning support provided by
members of the hosting family. These hosting family members are often students’
close relatives, typically grandparents (CASEN, 2013). Unfortunately, I do not have
access to information detailing which families were living with a hosting family when
applying. I am thus unable to estimate the effect of homeownership separately for
this subgroup.
Table 2.5 also shows that homeownership increases the probability of a fam-
ily living in a non-rudimentary house by 14 p.p. (Panel A, columns 3 and 4), for
students in elementary school. Better housing conditions are often associated with
better health outcomes, which might in turn result in improvements in learning.
Therefore, my results could suggest that the presumably positive effect from living
in a non-rudimentary house might be outweighed by the loss in learning support
described above. The remaining columns of Table 2.5 show no evidence that home-
ownership has an effect on school quality, moving more frequently to another school
or town, students’ self-esteem, parental engagement in student learning, parental
expectations on students, or more children being born into the family.
In previous work, Navarrete and Navarrete (2016) found that this same pro-
gram had a negative impact on employment, which might leave more adult home-
19 These results do not differ significantly from what is reported in this section.
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owners in the house, and should in turn increase the amount of learning support
provided at home. These seemingly contradictory results could be explained by two
factors. First, not all families in the sample used by Navarrete and Navarrete (2016)
have a child of school age, and the effect of homeownership on labor supply may
differ between the whole sample and the families in this sub-sample. Data availabil-
ity does not allow me to merge the dataset from this paper with the one used in
Navarrete and Navarrete (2016); therefore, I am unable to test this potential expla-
nations. Second, the smaller share of adults that do not enter the labor market may
not compensate for the sharp drop in learning support provided by hosting families.
While Navarrete and Navarrete (2016) find effects on labor market participation
ranging from 3 to 5 p.p., here the effect on the probability of living with a hosting
family ranges from 12 to 20 p.p.
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Figure 2.7: Mechanisms - Students in Elementary School
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Notes: Data are for students in elementary school who took the standardized test three years after the offer rounds.
The unit of observation is one student. Each dot represents the mean of students for the corresponding outcome
variable in a particular bin. Hosting Family is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the family lives in another family’s
house and 0 if not. Non-Rudimentary House is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the family lives in a house with
a concrete floor, an indoor bathroom, and access to potable water and 0 if not. Rooms is the number of rooms
in the house. Town Movers is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the family has moved to a different town than the
one that they lived in at the time of application and 0 if not. School Movers is a dummy variable equal to 1 if
the student has changed school since the time of application and 0 if not. School Quality is the school’s average
test score results measured in standard deviations. Self-Esteem is the student’s self-esteem measured in standard
deviations, determined using questions such as “How strongly do you agree with the statement: I am smart?”.
Parental Expectations is the parent’s expectations of students measured in standard deviation, determined using the
question “What is the highest educational level that you think your child will reach?”. Parental School Engagement
is the parental engagement in students’ learning measured in standard deviation, determined using questions such
as “How strongly do you feel that your parents help you to study?”. Bandwidth estimated using the procedure
proposed by Calonico et al. (2014).
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Table 2.5: Mechanisms - Students in Elementary School
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Hosting Family Non-Rudimentary House Rooms Town Mov. School Mov.
(Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.)
Panel A
Homeownership LATE -0.123*** -0.204*** 0.142*** 0.143*** 0.0713 0.129 -0.0219 -0.0600 -0.0158 -0.0210
(0.0368) (0.0628) (0.0327) (0.0521) (0.0608) (0.0951) (0.0290) (0.0460) (0.0460) (0.0735)
Observations 7,953 7,953 8,408 8,408 7,637 7,637 9,341 9,341 5,008 5,008
BANDWIDTH 149 149 160 160 142 142 154 154 146 146
School Quality Self-Esteem Parental Expect. Parental Eng. New Children
(Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.)
Panel B
Homeownership LATE -0.0457 -0.0838* 0.0334 0.0443 0.0107 -0.0801 -0.00521 0.0957 0.0417 0.0790
(0.0299) (0.0491) (0.101) (0.166) (0.0738) (0.123) (0.0667) (0.0959) (0.0354) (0.0548)
Observations 10,066 10,066 4,886 4,886 8,817 8,817 11,115 11,115 8,717 8,717
BANDWIDTH 168 168 155 155 173 173 228 228 167 167
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
GRADE FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
OFFER ROUND FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
REGION FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Data are for students in elementary school who took the standardized test three years after the offer rounds. The unit of
observation is one student. Hosting Family is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the family lives in another family’s house and 0 if not.
Non-Rudimentary House is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the family lives in a house with a concrete floor, an indoor bathroom,
and access to potable water and 0 if not. Rooms is the number of rooms in the house. Town Movers is a dummy variable equal
to 1 if the family has moved to a different town than the one that they lived in at the time of application and 0 if not. School
Movers is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the student has changed school since the time of application and 0 if not. School Quality
is the school’s average test score results measured in standard deviations. Self-Esteem is the student’s self-esteem measured in
standard deviations, determined using questions such as “How strongly do you agree with the statement: I am smart?”. Parental
Expectations is the parent’s expectations of students measured in standard deviation, determined using the question “What is the
highest educational level that you think your child will reach?”. Parental School Engagement is the parental engagement in students’
learning measured in standard deviation, determined using questions such as “How strongly do you feel that your parents help you
to study?”. Bandwidth estimated using the procedure proposed by Calonico et al. (2014). Standard errors are clustered at the
family level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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2.9 Concluding Remarks
Governments continue to allocate large sums of money to promote homeown-
ership. However, the effect of owning a house on many different outcomes, including
students’ overall learning, still remains unclear.
Using the arbitrary cut-off produced by a Chilean policy that provides poor
families with vouchers to purchase a house, I have implemented a fuzzy regression
discontinuity strategy to measure the effect of homeownership on students’ learning
outcomes. When considering the sample as a whole I find no significant results;
however, I observe that homeownership does decrease test scores by between 0.16σ
and 0.18σ for students in elementary school. I also show that the families of these
students are more likely to live in a higher-quality house and are less likely to live
with another hosting family. This latter mechanism is the most likely driver of the
effects on student learning, as younger students may face a decrease in the learning
support provided by hosting family members - often grandparents - when they move
with their parents to their new house.
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2.A Appendix: Questionnaires
2.A.1 Self-Esteem
How strongly do you agree with the following statements?
1. When I grow up I will accomplish all of my goals.
2. I am smart.
3. I am not afraid of talking in front of the class.
4. I remember what I learn in class.
2.A.2 Parental Engagement in School
How strongly do you feel that your parents do the following?
1. He/She helps me to study.
2. He/She helps me with homework.
3. He/She explains to me what I did not understand from school.
4. He/She knows my grades.
5. He/She congratulates me when I get a good grade.
2.A.3 Parental Expectations
1. What is the highest educational level that you think your child will reach?
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2.B Appendix: Tables
Table B1: Test Calendar
Grade Subject 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
2nd Reading X X X X
4th Reading X X X X X X X X X
Math X X X X X X X X X
6th Reading X X X
Math X X X
8th Reading X X X X X X
Math X X X X X X
10th Reading X X X X X X
Math X X X X X X
The X represents years in which the exam takes place for the corresponding grade and
subject. Second-grade mathematics is not shown as the test does not take place in any
year.
Table B2: First Stage
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Homeownership Homeownership
Winner Dummy 0.634*** 0.625***
(0.0144) (0.0206)
Constant -0.186*** -0.183***
(0.0243) (0.0244)
Observations 14,969 14,969
R-squared 0.529 0.529
BANDWIDTH 122 122
CONTROLS YES YES
REGION FE YES YES
OFFER ROUND FE YES YES
Notes: Data are for students who took the standardized
test three years after the offer rounds. The unit of observa-
tion is one student. Benchmark bandwidth estimated using
the procedure proposed by Calonico et al. (2014). Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the family level. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B3: Mechanisms on Students - Sample
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Hosting Family Non-Rudimentary House Rooms Town Mov. School Mov.
(Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.)
Panel A
Homeownership LATE -0.110*** -0.157*** 0.145*** 0.102*** 0.0912* 0.115 0.00317 -0.0196 0.0486* 0.0502
(0.0287) (0.0449) (0.0256) (0.0385) (0.0547) (0.0869) (0.0219) (0.0354) (0.0277) (0.0405)
Observations 14,370 14,370 14,826 14,826 14,063 14,063 17,935 17,935 13,024 13,024
BANDWIDTH 136 136 141 141 132 132 151 151 140 140
School Quality Self-Esteem Parental Expect. Parental Eng. New Children
(Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.)
Panel B
Homeownership LATE -0.00201 -0.0229 -0.000781 -0.0818 0.0106 -0.0506 0.0311 0.0682 0.00626 -0.0147
(0.0241) (0.0370) (0.0542) (0.0810) (0.0535) (0.0803) (0.0504) (0.0725) (0.0250) (0.0402)
Observations 19,405 19,405 14,984 14,984 16,858 16,858 18,899 18,899 15,938 15,938
BANDWIDTH 166 166 183 183 177 177 204 204 154 154
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
GRADE FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
OFFER ROUND FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
REGION FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Data are for students who took the standardized test three years after the offer rounds. The unit of observation is one
student. Hosting Family is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the family lives in another family’s house and 0 if not. Non-Rudimentary
House is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the family lives in a house with a concrete floor, an indoor bathroom, and access to potable
water and 0 if not. Rooms is the number of rooms in the house. Town Movers is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the family has
moved to a different town than the one that they lived in at the time of application and 0 if not. School Movers is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the student has changed school since the time of application and 0 if not. School Quality is the school’s average test
score results measured in standard deviations. Self-Esteem is the student’s self-esteem measured in standard deviations, determined
using questions such as “How strongly do you agree with the statement: I am smart?”. Parental Expectations is the parent’s
expectations of students measured in standard deviation, determined using the question “What is the highest educational level
that you think your child will reach?”. Parental School Engagement is the parental engagement in students’ learning measured in
standard deviation, determined using questions such as “How strongly do you feel that your parents help you to study?”. Benchmark
bandwidth estimated using the procedure proposed by Calonico et al. (2014). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B4: Mechanisms on Students in Middle and High School
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Hosting Family Non-Rudimentary House Rooms Town Mov. School Mov.
(Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.)
Panel A
Homeownership LATE -0.103*** -0.0923* 0.144*** 0.0709 0.0862 0.157 0.0163 0.0333 0.0904*** 0.0942*
(0.0348) (0.0541) (0.0325) (0.0498) (0.0759) (0.127) (0.0283) (0.0433) (0.0331) (0.0485)
Observations 7,815 7,815 7,274 7,274 7,493 7,493 9,368 9,368 7,934 7,934
BANDWIDTH 156 156 143 143 148 148 164 164 136 136
School Quality Self-Esteem Parental Expect. Parent Eng. New Children
(Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.) (Linear) (Quad.)
Panel B
Homeownership LATE 0.0397 0.0233 -0.0597 -0.0951 -0.00969 -0.0275 0.0511 0.0418 -0.0416 -0.0781*
(0.0341) (0.0519) (0.0677) (0.104) (0.0709) (0.102) (0.0688) (0.101) (0.0298) (0.0459)
Observations 9,800 9,800 8,404 8,404 8,473 8,473 9,231 9,231 8,099 8,099
BANDWIDTH 173 173 159 159 194 194 217 217 162 162
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
GRADE FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
OFFER ROUND FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
REGION FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Data are for students in middle and high school who took the standardized test three years after the offer rounds. The
unit of observation is one student. Hosting Family is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the family lives in another family’s house and
0 if not. Non-Rudimentary House is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the family lives in a house with a concrete floor, an indoor
bathroom, and access to potable water and 0 if not. Rooms is the number of rooms in the house. Town Movers is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the family has moved to a different town than the one that they lived in at the time of application and 0 if not.
School Movers is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the student has changed school since the time of application and 0 if not. School
Quality is the school’s average test score results measured in standard deviations. Self-Esteem is the student’s self-esteem measured
in standard deviations, determined using questions such as “How strongly do you agree with the statement: I am smart?”. Parental
Expectations is the parent’s expectations of students measured in standard deviation, determined using the question “What is the
highest educational level that you think your child will reach?”. Parental School Engagement is the parental engagement in students’
learning measured in standard deviation, determined using questions such as “How strongly do you feel that your parents help you
to study?”. Benchmark bandwidth estimated using the procedure proposed by Calonico et al. (2014). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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2.C Appendix: Figures
Figure C1: Bandwidth Sensitivity
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Figure C2: Profile of Grades
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Notes: Data are for students who took the standardized test three years after
the offer rounds. The unit of observation is one student. A dot represents the
point estimate for the corresponding grade. Confidence intervals are calculated
at 95% confidence.
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Figure C3: Mechanisms on Students - Sample
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Notes: Data are for students who took the standardized test three years after the offer rounds. The unit of
observation is one student. Each dot represents the mean of students for the corresponding outcome variable in
a particular bin. Hosting Family is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the family lives in another family’s house
and 0 if not. Non-Rudimentary House is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the family lives in a house with a
concrete floor, an indoor bathroom, and access to potable water and 0 if not. Rooms is the number of rooms in
the house. Town Movers is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the family has moved to a different town than the
one that they lived in at the time of application and 0 if not. School Movers is a dummy variable equal to 1 if
the student has changed school since the time of application and 0 if not. School Quality is the school’s average
test score results measured in standard deviations. Self-Esteem is the student’s self-esteem measured in standard
deviations, determined using questions such as “How strongly do you agree with the statement: I am smart?”.
Parental Expectations is the parent’s expectations of students measured in standard deviation, determined using the
question “What is the highest educational level that you think your child will reach?”. Parental School Engagement
is the parental engagement in students’ learning measured in standard deviation, determined using questions such
as “How strongly do you feel that your parents help you to study?”. Benchmark bandwidth estimated using the
procedure proposed by Calonico et al. (2014).
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Figure C4: Mechanisms on Students in Middle and High School
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Notes: Data are for students in middle or high school who took the standardized test three years after the offer
rounds. The unit of observation is one student. Each dot represents the mean of students for the corresponding
outcome variable in a particular bin. Hosting Family is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the family lives in another
family’s house and 0 if not. Non-Rudimentary House is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the family lives in a house
with a concrete floor, an indoor bathroom, and access to potable water and 0 if not. Rooms is the number of
rooms in the house. Town Movers is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the family has moved to a different town than
the one that they lived in at the time of application and 0 if not. School Movers is a dummy variable equal to 1
if the student has changed school since the time of application and 0 if not. School Quality is the school’s average
test score results measured in standard deviations. Self-Esteem is the student’s self-esteem measured in standard
deviations, determined using questions such as “How strongly do you agree with the statement: I am smart?”.
Parental Expectations is the parent’s expectations of students measured in standard deviation, determined using the
question “What is the highest educational level that you think your child will reach?”. Parental School Engagement
is the parental engagement in students’ learning measured in standard deviation, determined using questions such
as “How strongly do you feel that your parents help you to study?”. Benchmark bandwidth estimated using the
procedure proposed by Calonico et al. (2014).
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Chapter 3
When do School Principals
Matter?: the effects of a reform
in the selection procedure of
school principals on school
outcomes.
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3.1 Introduction
Following the ideas presented in literature studying the leaders of firms, schol-
ars have claimed in recent years that those at the head of schools - namely, school
principals - constitute a significant input in educational production. Principals can
influence students’ learning in two ways: 1) by changing the school climate in which
students learn, and; 2) by closely monitoring teachers, which influences pedagogical
practices and in turn has an effect on students’ learning (Di Liberto et al., 2015).
However, a fundamental difference exists between the director of a firm and a school
principal, namely the incentives that they face in different institutional settings.
While a director of a firm risks losing their job if their company does not make
high enough profits, school principals are not necessarily made accountable if their
students should fail to improve in their performance.
The growing body of literature on school principals has implemented mostly
correlational and value-added studies. Correlational studies tend to find that im-
proving principals’ practices of monitoring teachers increases students’ learning out-
comes (Bloom et al., 2015; Di Liberto et al., 2015). Value-added studies have found
0 to 0.15 standard deviation (σ) increases in student learning when a principal’s
effectiveness increases by 1σ (Branch et al., 2012; Grissom et al., 2014; Laing et al.,
2016; Bo¨hlmark et al., 2012; Crawfurd, 2016; Agasisti et al., 2016). Tavares (2015)
is the only quasi-experimental paper focusing on ‘principal effects’ of which I am
aware. Using a regression discontinuity design, she explores a large program in
Sao Paolo (Brazil) that teaches managerial practices to principals in low-performing
schools and finds positive effects on school climates and teacher practices. Regard-
ing test scores, she finds that mathematics test scores increase by 0.05σ for poorly
achieving students in eighth grade. The real impact of school principals on schools
and the variation throughout different institutional settings thus remains very much
in debate.
This paper explores a reform that changes the way in which school princi-
pals in Chile are appointed when an incumbent principal comes to the end of their
five-year fixed term. This reform provides a plausibly exogenous variation in the
characteristics of principals leading public schools, in a setting where school em-
ployees are almost impossible to fire or incentivize,1 and the mayor is ultimately
responsible for all hiring decisions.2
Prior to the reform, the mayor appointed school principals in public schools
1 School employees in this paper refers to school principals, the school management team, and
teachers.
2 Hiring decisions in this paper are restricted to school employee.
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directly and without external supervision. This system raised concern from the gov-
ernment regarding the quality of principals. In April 2012, a reform was introduced
to address these concerns, aiming to increase the number of more highly educated
and motivated principals who would be better able to monitor teachers and ensure
a less conflictive and a more cooperative school climate (Servicio Civil, 2012). This
reform mandated that mayors open applications to the public when school principal
positions are renewed. This call for applications must be registered with the govern-
ment and fixed for a certain time period. Following this, the applicants are judged
first by an independent company, and then by a separate committee. Only the final
decision is made by the mayor, who chooses from the reduced pool of applicants that
passed the previous steps. Furthermore, the government closely monitors this whole
process. This reform did not alter any aspect related to the period of time that
principals spend in office, nor the terms of school employees’ contracts regarding
their job security.
Since the reform solely affects this principal renewal process, I implemented
a difference-in-differences strategy to explore the effect of principals instated after
the reform on various aspects of their schools. Following this, I used schools that
renewed their principal under the reform conditions before 2015 as a treated group,
and those that had not renewed their principal as a control group.3 My results show
that the reform has brought in principals who are on average 4.5 years younger, have
6.8 years less experience, and are 13% more likely to hold a postgraduate degree.
This is consistent with the reform’s goal of drawing more motivated and educated
principals into the public school system. I also note that, prior to the reform,
these changes in principals’ characteristics were not typical at the end of a five-year
principal term.
I go on to analyze the changes that post-reform principals generate in schools.
First, I study the characteristics of other school staff members and find that, in
schools with a principal appointed under the new regime, the management team is
around 1.5 years younger, has 2 years less experience, and is 4.8% more likely to
hold a postgraduate degree.4 On the other hand, teachers’ characteristics do not
change much following the arrival of new principals. This is consistent with the high
rigidity of the school staff.
Following this, I use a panel dataset of teacher questionnaires to analyze the
changes to school climate produced by post-reform principals. Under the new prin-
3 The average length of time that a post-reform principal has been in their position during the
time of the study is 1.65 years.
4 The management team are those employees who perform managerial tasks but are not the prin-
cipal. Examples include the vice principal or the director of pedagogical methods.
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cipals, school violence decreases by 0.10σ,5 and community engagement increases
by 0.07σ.6 These results are in line with the goal of introducing principals who are
able to foster a less conflict-ridden, more cooperative school climate.
I also use this questionnaire to establish whether post-reform principals gen-
erate changes in teacher-monitoring practices and teachers’ pedagogical methods in
the classroom.7 I found no discernible effect of new principals on these two dimen-
sions, suggesting that the government is failing in its attempt to increase monitoring
and change pedagogical approaches. The fact that both principals and teachers face
no motivation to improve their own performance - they are almost impossible to
fire or incentivize - could explain these unexpected results. Consistent with this ex-
planation, correlational studies have also found that principals can be less effective
in a rigid institutional context (Bloom et al., 2015). Finally, I explore the effect of
post-reform principals on students’ test results, and do not observe any significant
change over the period analyzed.
Due to data availability, I am only able to study the short-term effects of
school principals. It is possible that, in the long run, an effect on test scores may
emerge given that principals might need a longer period of time to produce an
impact on student learning, as suggested by Grissom et al. (2014).
This paper contributes to the existing literature in two different ways. First,
the results of this paper suggest that the institutional context in which principals
operate can be influential, and thus must be taken into account when analyzing the
effects of school principals. Second, I provide quasi-experimental evidence showing
that principals can indeed improve school climates, and that potential correlations
between school climate and monitoring practices should be taken into account in
future studies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents the
institutional background and explains the reform in detail. Section 3.3 describes
the dataset I use in this project. Section 3.4 presents the empirical framework and
results. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes.
5 School violence is measured using questions such as “How often have fights occurred between
students this year?”.
6 Community engagement is measured using questions such as “How strongly do you agree with
the statement: The principal involves parents in school activities?”.
7 Teaching-monitoring practices are measured using questions such as ”How strongly do you agree
with the statement: The principal evaluates teacher performance in terms of students’ academic
progress?”. Teachers’ pedagogic practices covers several factors including: 1) Class organization,
which is measured using questions such as “How often do you ask students to work in teams?”; 2)
Evaluation methods, which is measured using questions such as “How often do you assign a school
project to evaluate students?”; and 3) Teaching methods, which is measured using questions such
as “How often do you go over test answers during class?”.
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3.2 Institutional Background
3.2.1 Educational System
The Chilean educational system is comprised of three school types: private,
voucher, and public schools. Private and voucher schools are governed by private
institutions, and as such were not affected by the school principal appointment re-
form. Public schools, however, are administered by municipalities, and the mayor
bears the responsibility for all educational decisions that occur within the public
system.8 Students attending public schools tend to come from more disadvantaged
families than students at private and voucher schools. The difference in socioeco-
nomic backgrounds is not only due to the higher school fees of private and voucher
schools,9 but is also the result of public schools having no say in who does or does
not attend their institution.
On the topic of school violence, the Ministry of Education (2007) finds that
70% of teachers in public schools declare that a violent incident occurs at least
once a week in their classroom. Alongside this, 47% of students declare to have
been victims of school violence within the last year. Aggressive incidents are more
common among students from low socioeconomics backgrounds, while psychological
violence (e.g. bullying) is more common amongst those with higher socioeconomic
backgrounds.
3.2.2 School Employees
Chilean schools contain three types of employees who are relevant for this
paper. These three types are: 1) the school principal, who is the head of the school,
2) the management team, meaning employees who perform managerial tasks but
are not the principal,10 and 3) teachers, whose only duty is to teach classes.
From the early 1990s to the present day, the process of hiring and firing
employees in public schools has been rigidly set. By law, school principals remain
in office for a five-year fixed term, and principals, as well as the management team
and teachers, are extremely difficult to dismiss or incentivize, irrespective of their
performance. Moreover, since the mayor is ultimately responsible for any educa-
tional resolutions in public schools, principals are not directly involved in the hiring
8 In legal terms, all school buildings and employees are part of the municipality, and therefore the
mayor is ultimately in charge of them.
9 All private schools charge some fees to students’ families, and most voucher schools charge addi-
tional fees on the top of governmental subsidies.
10 For example, the vice principal or the director of pedagogical methods.
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process.
3.2.3 The School Principal Reform
Prior to the reform, the mayor appointed school principals directly, with-
out any outside supervision over the process. In the late 2000s, the government
expressed concern regarding the discretion afforded to mayors in appointing princi-
pals. The government felt that this often resulted in mayors appointing principals
of low quality due to personal or political connections.
In April 2012, a new regime was implemented in an attempt to increase the
quality of principals and improve school conditions. The new regime mandated that
mayors open applications to the general public every time that a public school princi-
pal position becomes available. This application process follows five steps. First, the
municipality undertaking the call for applicants must register the process with the
central government agency, the “Servicio Civil” (Civil Service), which will supervise
the process. During this registration period, the Civil Service and the municipality
fix a time schedule for the application process. Second, the Civil Service and the
municipality publicly announce the call for applicants and the application process
begins.11 Third, once the application stage has come to a close, a private company
selects the twelve most suitable candidates.12 This company selects candidates by
assigning them a score based on an assessment of their curriculum, cover letter, and
interviews against the profile required for the position. The final twelve candidates
are those with the highest scores. Fourth, a committee is formed from three peo-
ple: 1) a teacher from the municipality, selected at random, 2) one person from the
national office of the Civil Service, and 3) the head of the municipal Department of
Education. This committee selects a final shortlist of three to five candidates, again
using a scoring system based on the same assessment points used in the previous
step. Finally, from this last group, the mayor selects the new school principal.
To ensure that the application process is truly public, the Civil Service takes
several measures. The call for applicants is widely advertised in newspapers and
social media. If a position receives fewer than five applicants, the process is cancelled
and a new call for applications takes place. People can apply to the Civil Service or
to the municipality, and this choice has no effect on the likelihood of being appointed.
Through this process, the government claims to provide an equal opportunity for
every applicant.
11 Every individual with a Chilean working permit and experience in education is eligible for the
position.
12 In the small number of schools with more than 1,000 students, the private company may select
the fifteen most suitable candidates.
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The reform was based around specific goals, for which certain minimum
criteria are set for each application and appointment process. One goal of the
reform is to promote the appointment of principals who are more highly educated,
and are better equipped to monitor teacher and student progress (Servicio Civil,
2012). To achieve this, the external company and the committee assign higher points
to candidates who have particularly relevant degrees for the position (for example,
pedagogical or management degrees), who have advanced degrees in these areas
(for example, a master’s or Ph.D. degree), and who have experience in monitoring
teachers and developing educational plans (for example, experience as part of a
school management team or acting as an advisor to a management team). These
points are assigned in a deterministic manner; for instance, applicants with a relevant
master’s degree in pedagogy receive fifteen points, while an applicant with a relevant
bachelor’s degree receives five points.
Another governmental goal is to incorporate more motivated school leaders
who would be able to ensure a less conflictive and more cooperative school climate.
To this end, the Civil Service requires that the selection process assign higher points
to applicants who are able to promote a mutually respectful school climate, who
can more deeply incorporate the wider school community into the school, and who
have the ability to deal with situations of conflict that may arise. Since these
characteristics are effectively unobservable, the external company and the committee
base their judgment of these attributes on applicants’ curriculum, cover letters, and
interviews.
The reform did not introduce significant changes in the autonomy of princi-
pals nor the job security of school employees. The mayor continues to be ultimately
responsible for all educational decisions that occur in a school, and dismissal of
school employees remains a difficult process.
3.3 Data
To perform the analysis, I have used five different administrative datasets
from two different governmental institutions. The Ministry of Education provided
the first four datasets, which allowed me to identify the school that each student at-
tends, students’ scores in a standardized test, the teachers’ questionnaire responses,
and the characteristics of school employees in each school. The Civil Service provided
the fifth dataset, identifying which schools renewed their principal under post-reform
conditions. I focus on observations from 2009 to 2014 for reasons that I will explain
in Section 3.3.3.
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3.3.1 Student Enrollment
To identify the school attended by each student, I use the Student Enrollment
(SE) dataset. To build this source, the Ministry of Education collects monthly
enrollment reports containing all students in every school throughout Chile. The
SE dataset provides information about a student’s gender, grade (year level), GPA,
attendance, whether they pass or fail, school type, and school name. The dataset
also contains school ID and student ID information that allows me to integrate all
the datasets listed below with the SE dataset. I then eliminate all schools that
are not public schools, as they are not affected by the reform (Section 3.2.3), and
balance the panel, keeping all schools that were active between 2009 and 2014.
3.3.2 SIMCE Scores
To measure students’ learning outcomes, I use the Chilean national stan-
dardized test in education, SIMCE.13 For this paper, I have used the results from
SIMCE tests for Spanish and mathematics, as they are mandatory in every year.14
This SIMCE dataset contains test scores for the two chosen subjects, student ID,
and the school grade of every student who sat the SIMCE.15 I merge the SIMCE
scores with the SE dataset using the student ID, the year of the test, and the stu-
dent’s school grade.
Given that some schools will start or stop offering certain grades throughout
time, I have kept in the panel all schools in which the same school grades took the
test between 2009 and 2014. For this purpose, I use test scores from students in
fourth, eighth, and tenth grades, as these were the only grades to commence testing
in 2009 or earlier.16
3.3.3 SIMCE Teacher’s Questionnaire
To measure school attributes, I use the SIMCE teacher’s questionnaire. The
questionnaire contains answers from all teachers with a student sitting the SIMCE
in a given year. The teachers fill in the questionnaire while the students take the
test, and the results provide information about the school, its environment, and the
particular teacher’s classes.
13 From its Spanish name, Sistema de Medicio´n de la Calidad de la Educacio´n.
14 There are also tests for the subjects of social science, English, and natural science; however,
students do not take these every year.
15 This dataset does not contain any demographic variables for the students.
16 A complete detailing of test schedules and timing can be found in Table B1 in the appendix.
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The questionnaire covers topics such as school violence (for example, “How
often have fights between students occurred this year?”), evaluation methods (“How
often do you assign a test with open questions requiring a detailed response to
evaluate students?”), and class organization (“How often do you ask students to
give a presentation in front of the class?”), amongst others.17 Aside from the gender
of the respondent, the questionnaire gives no demographic variables. I merged the
SIMCE teacher questionnaire with the previous dataset using the school ID, year,
and the grade being taught.
I was able to build a balanced panel of teachers’ responses from 2009 on-
wards because, beyond that year, few questions were removed from the question-
naire.18 Using Spanish and mathematics teachers’ answers for fourth, eighth and
tenth grades, I built a homogeneous panel of teachers’ responses across years, grades,
and schools.
3.3.4 School Employees
I use this dataset to measure the characteristics of school employees. This is
a source collected by the Ministry of Education containing all school employees for
every school in Chile. The information is collected in the middle of the academic
year (July) for administrative purposes. Given the nature of mid-year data, if a new
school employee was assigned to a school in July or earlier, I assigned them to that
given year.
School staff data contains a comprehensive set of variables for school employ-
ees such as degree held, role in the school, working hours, and teaching hours. Using
the detailed set of employee roles, I have classified school employees into three ex-
clusive groups following the classification used in the Chilean school system: school
principal, management team, and teachers.19 This School Employees dataset was
then combined with the previous datasets using school ID and year.
3.3.5 Call for Application
I use this dataset to identify the schools that renewed their principal under
the reform conditions. The Civil Service provides this information, which contains
the universe of all public calls to appoint school principals. Since the Civil Service
17 The complete set of questions used in this paper can be found in Appendix 3.A.
18 During the early to mid-2000s, the set of questions was consistent, but in 2009 authorities updated
the questionnaires, replacing the majority of the questions. Since 2009, the Ministry of Educa-
tion has kept the questionnaire consistent, and the changes that have been made are generally
questions being adding rather than removed.
19 See Section 3.2.2.
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supervises all principal selection processes, they register each call for applications at
the moment it begins. This dataset provides the school ID, whether the application
call was successful or cancelled, the date of the call, and the date on which the
principal started working. I merge the Call for Application dataset with all previous
datasets using the school ID.
3.3.6 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics of Students
Sample Post-Reform Principal No Post-Reform Principal
p-value of equality of
means test col. 2 & 3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female 0.500 0.516 0.489 0.000
(0.500) (0.500) (0.500)
Attendance 91.416 91.229 91.539 0.000
(10.838) (8.491) (12.131)
Pass Rate 0.976 0.977 0.976 0.062
(0.152) (0.150) (0.1530
GPA 5.623 5.631 5.617 0.000
(0.586) (0.585) (0.586)
Observations 378360 149837 228523
Notes Data taken from years prior to the reform (2009 to 2011). Each observation represents
one student taking the SIMCE during this period. Column 1 shows data for students in the
sample, column 2 for students in schools that instated a post-reform principal, and column 3
for students in schools that did not instate a post-reform principal. Column 1 is the sum total
of columns 2 and 3. Column 4 shows the p-value for the mean difference test between columns
2 and 3. Female refers to the percentage of students who are female. Attendance refers to
the average attendance of the students over the year. Pass Rate is the percentage of students
who advanced to the next grade. The GPA scale is from 1 to 7 points. Standard errors are in
parentheses.
Table 3.1 shows the descriptive statistics for data on students collected prior
to the reform. The proportion of female students in the sample is 50%, and schools
that would go on to instate a post-reform principal have around 2.3% more female
students sitting the SIMCE than schools that did not. Attendance is around 91%,
the pass rate is around 97%, and the GPA is around 5.6%. For these last three
variables, the statistically significant differences shown in column 4 seem to be simply
a result of the large number of observations, rather than reflecting some sort of
selection in particular types of schools.
Table 3.2 shows descriptive statistics for data on schools collected prior to the
reform. On average, schools in the sample group had around 390 enrolled students,20
20 This is the total number of students enrolled in the school across all grades.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics of Schools
Sample Post-Reform Principal No Post-Reform Principal
p-value of equality of
means test col. 2 & 3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
School Enrolment 391.112 454.632 358.676 0.000
(348.980) (350.769) (343.611)
SIMCE Takers 58.643 67.609 54.065 0.000
(65.497) (66.165) (64.685)
Principal Experience 31.743 32.098 31.562 0.030
(8.608) (8.498) (8.659)
Principal Age 56.386 56.882 56.133 0.000
(6.509) (6.523) (6.489)
Principal Contract Hours 43.899 43.876 43.911 0.319
(1.128) (1.322) (1.016)
Female Principal 0.382 0.409 0.368 0.004
(0.486) (0.492) (0.482)
Observations 5393 1823 3570
Notes Data taken from years before the reform, from 2009 to 2011. Each observation is at the school level.
Column 1 shows data for schools in the sample, column 2 for schools that instated a post-reform principal,
and column 3 for schools that did not instate a post-reform principal. Column 1 is the sum total of columns 2
and 3. Column 4 shows the p-value for the mean difference test between columns 2 and 3. School Enrollment
represents the number of students registered in the school. SIMCE Takers represents the combined number
of students in fourth, eighth, and tenth grades who sat the SIMCE. Principal Experience represents the
number of years that a principal has been in the educational system. Principal Contract Hours represents
the number of contracted hours of work that a principal has in a given school. Female Principal represents
the percentage of principals who are female. Standard errors are in parentheses.
and the number of students taking the SIMCE was around 58.21 Columns 2 and 3
show that schools that would go on to instate a post-reform principal had a higher
number of enrolled students across the whole school and a higher number of students
taking the SIMCE than schools that did not.22 I have no hypothesis as to why these
particular schools are somehow bigger.
Principals of schools that instated post-reform principals had half a year
more experience in the educational system. The size of this difference does not
seem relevant when compared with the average number of years of experience (32
years). Finally, schools with post-reform principals had 4% more female principals
than schools without. This may be simply an effect of timing, suggesting that the
male-female division in the educational system, particularly in managerial positions,
is shifting throughout the years.
21 This refers only to students in fourth, eighth, and tenth grades who sat the test.
22 In Section 3.4.5, I show that this pre-existing difference in school size is not driving the effects
found throughout the paper (Section 3.4.5).
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3.4 Results
3.4.1 Principal and School Employee Characteristics
To assess whether the reform changes the characteristics of the principal
appointed, I perform a difference-in-differences estimation. The treatment group is
made up of the public schools that appointed a principal between the beginning of
the reform (April 2012) and 2014, and control group is made up of those that did
not.23 The dependent variable is one of the characteristics of the principals drawn
from the School Employees dataset. The estimated equation is as follows:
Principal Characteristicsi,s,t = δ + αs + γt + β ∗ (treated ∗ post)s,t + ei,s,t (3.1)
where (treated ∗ post)s,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 for schools in the
treatment group, starting from the year in which the post-reform principal is in
office, δ is the constant of the equation, αs is a school fixed effect, and γt is a year
fixed effect. The coefficient of interest is β, which is the difference-in-differences
estimator.
Results in Table 3.3 reveal that the reform brings in principals who have
around 6.8 years less experience in the educational system (column 1) and are 4.5
years younger (column 2). One potential explanation of why post-reform principals
are younger is that the reform actively searches for more motivated principals, and it
is possible that younger, less-experienced principals are more motivated. Column 3
shows that post-reform principals are 13% more likely to hold a postgraduate degree.
The 2.3-year gap in the point estimates between experience and age could therefore
be the result of post-reform principals spending more time engaged in study, and
thus joining the educational system at a later age.
Results in Table 3.3 are consistent with the government’s goal of bringing
more motivated and educated leaders into the public school system, and are likely to
be the mechanical result of the points-based procedure used in the application and
hiring process. These results are also consistent with governmental reports, which
stated that under the reform, old principals would not be simply reappointed, and
new principals would be enticed to join the system. According to the Civil Service,
seven out of ten post-reform principals had not previously been principals in the
school in which they were assigned (Servicio Civil, 2015).
23 The average length of time that a post-reform principal has been in their position during the
time of the study is 1.65 years.
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Table 3.3: Effect of Reform on Principals’ Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES Experience Age Postgraduate Degree in education Contract Hours Teaching Hours Female
Treated*Post -6.876*** -4.533*** 0.130*** -0.00277 0.0242 -1.102 0.0102
(0.619) (0.446) (0.0238) (0.00317) (0.0698) (0.682) (0.0248)
Constant 31.47*** 56.10*** 0.232*** 0.995*** 43.89*** 17.78*** 0.375***
(0.336) (0.256) (0.0134) (0.00139) (0.0324) (0.799) (0.0137)
Observations 10,886 10,886 10,886 10,886 10,886 10,886 10,886
R-squared 0.586 0.622 0.722 0.640 0.354 0.470 0.747
YEAR FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
SCHOOL FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Each observation is at the school level. The average length of time that a post-reform principal has been in
their position during the time of the study is 1.65 years. Experience represents the number of years that the principal
has been working in the educational system. Age is the age of the principal in years. Postgraduate represents whether
or not the principal holds a postgraduate degree. Degree in Education represents whether or not the principal holds
a degree in education. Contract Hours represents the number of contracted hours worked by the principal. Teaching
Hours represents the number of hours that the principal spends teaching classes in school. Female is a dummy variable
representing whether or not the principal is female. Standard errors are clustered at the school level. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
One might be tempted to think that the effects shown in Table 3.3 are a
mechanical result of any principal renewal process, rather than being the result of
the reform. To address this point, I have estimated Equation 3.1, but considering
the two years of principal renewal processes directly prior to the reform (2010 and
2011). Table 3.4 shows that these renewals instated principals who had less than
one year less experience (column 1) and were one year younger (column 2). The
remaining effects are not significant. This piece of evidence suggests that the effects
of a renewal on principals’ characteristics prior to the reform were much smaller
than those that took place afterwards.
Table 3.4: Effects of Principal Renewal Pre-Reform on Principals’ Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES Experience Age Postgraduate Degree in education Contract Hours Teaching Hours Female
Treated*Post -0.813** -0.983*** 0.0107 -0.000183 -0.0375 -1.435 -0.00325
(0.377) (0.247) (0.0155) (0.00341) (0.0598) (1.039) (0.0162)
Constant 31.79*** 56.14*** 0.215*** 0.996*** 43.91*** 19.72*** 0.355***
(0.333) (0.231) (0.0140) (0.000960) (0.0275) (0.953) (0.0150)
Observations 8,999 8,999 8,999 8,999 8,999 8,999 8,999
R-squared 0.665 0.689 0.804 0.680 0.518 0.595 0.773
YEAR FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
SCHOOL FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Each observation is at the school level. Experience represents the number of years that the principal has been
working in the educational system. Age is the age of the principal in years. Postgraduate represents whether or not
the principal holds a postgraduate degree. Degree in Education represents whether or not the principal holds a degree
in education. Contract Hours represents the number of contracted hours worked by the principal. Teaching Hours
represents the number of hours that the principal spends teaching classes in school. Female is a dummy variable
representing whether or not the principal is female. Standard errors are clustered at the school level. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
To see whether changes in principal characteristics translate into changes in
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school staff, I performed Equation 3.1, but using the school average of management
team characteristics and teacher characteristics as dependent variables. Table 3.5
shows that after the reform, the management team has on average around two
years less experience in the educational system (column 1), is 1.5 years younger
(column 2), and is 4.8% more likely to hold a postgraduate degree (column 3).24
The effects of the reform on the characteristics of principals and their management
staff are similar, but less pronounced in the latter group. I expected these smaller
effects, given the high rigidity of the management team within the school system.
One further possible explanation for this correlation is that, when a position for
management staff opens, principals are able to partially influence mayors to hire
employees with similar characteristics to themselves (younger, less experienced, and
more highly educated).
Results in Table 3.6 show that the experience (column 1) and age (column
2) of teachers diminishes by approximately one year. Despite their statistical sig-
nificance, these effects are much smaller than for principals and their management
team, thus reflecting the lack of flexibility in the hiring and firing of teachers.
The evidence discussed in this section suggests that the reform has brought
about principals who are more educated, younger, and less experienced (and perhaps
more strongly motivated). The reform has had similar albeit weaker effects on the
management team, whilst for teachers there is almost no effect.
Table 3.5: Effect of Post-Reform Principal on Management Team Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES Experience Age Postgraduate Degree in education Contract Hours Teaching Hours Female
Treated*Post -2.140*** -1.423*** 0.0480*** 0.00315 0.243 -0.168 0.0125
(0.487) (0.371) (0.0180) (0.00362) (0.172) (0.667) (0.0166)
Constant 29.31*** 54.32*** 0.279*** 0.992*** 42.64*** 19.77*** 0.571***
(0.263) (0.210) (0.0100) (0.00193) (0.112) (0.609) (0.0114)
Observations 8,082 8,082 8,082 8,082 8,082 8,082 8,082
R-squared 0.622 0.647 0.784 0.536 0.625 0.517 0.721
YEAR FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
SCHOOL FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Each observation is the average of the management team’s characteristics in the school. The average length
of time that a post-reform principal has been in their position during the time of the study is 1.65 years. Experience
represents the average number of years that the management team has been employed in the educational system. Age
is the average age of the management team in years. Postgraduate is the percentage of people in the management team
that hold a postgraduate degree. Degree in Education is the percentage of people in the management team that hold
a degree in education. Contract Hours represents the average number of contracted hours worked by the management
team. Teaching Hours represents the average number hours that the management team spends teaching in the school.
Female is a dummy variable representing whether or not the principal is female. Standard errors are clustered at the
school level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
24 The slight decrease in the number of observations for the management team is due to some schools
having no management team.
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Table 3.6: Effect of Post-Reform Principal on Teacher Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES Experience Age Postgraduate Degree in education Contract Hours Teaching Hours Female
Treated*Post -0.688*** -0.520*** 0.0109 -0.000310 0.267** -0.136 0.00484
(0.185) (0.157) (0.00730) (0.00242) (0.125) (0.200) (0.00387)
Constant 20.22*** 47.56*** 0.247*** 0.944*** 34.32*** 28.16*** 0.680***
(0.150) (0.130) (0.00501) (0.00234) (0.107) (0.214) (0.00413)
Observations 10,886 10,886 10,886 10,886 10,886 10,886 10,886
R-squared 0.737 0.738 0.911 0.725 0.762 0.771 0.841
YEAR FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
SCHOOL FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Each observation is the average of the teachers’ characteristics in the school. The average length of time that
a post-reform principal has been in their position during the time of the study is 1.65 years. Experience represents
the average number of years that teachers have been employed in the educational system. Age is the average age of
teachers in years. Postgraduate is percentage of teachers that hold a postgraduate degree. Degree in Education is the
percentage of teachers that hold a degree in education. Contract Hours represents the average number of contracted
hours worked by teachers. Teaching Hours represents the average number hours that the teachers spend teaching in the
school. Female is a dummy variable representing whether or not the principal is female. Standard errors are clustered
at the school level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
3.4.2 School Environment and Teacher Practices
To estimate the ways in which post-reform principals have affected school
climate, teacher-monitoring practices, and teachers’ pedagogical practices, I have
estimated the following difference-in-differences equation:
School Attributes,t = δ + αs + γt + β ∗ (treated ∗ post)s,t + es,t (3.2)
where School Attributes,t is the average of a particular characteristic of the
school, provided by teachers through the SIMCE questionnaire, for school s in year
t. The coefficient of interest is β which measures the effect of post-reform principals
on these school characteristics.
Table 3.7 shows the ways in which schools change under the direction of
post-reform principals. Column 1 shows that community engagement increases by
0.07σ and column 2 shows that school violence decreases by 0.10σ. These results
suggest that the government was able to achieve its goal of introducing principals
who will create a less conflictive and a more cooperative school climate.
Column 3 shows no effect of post-reform principals on teaching-monitoring
practices. Furthermore, I do not observe any effect on class organization (column 4),
evaluation methods (column 5), or teaching methods (column 6). These results sug-
gest that post-reform principals are not implementing better monitoring practices,
and therefore the teachers’ pedagogical practices in the classroom are not changing.
This implies that the reform fails in its goal of introducing principals who are better
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able to monitor teacher and student progress.
Table 3.7: Effect of Post-Reform Principals on School Climate, Monitoring
Practices, and Pedagogical Methods
School Climate Teacher’s Pedagogical Methods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES Community Engagement Violence Monitoring Pract. Class Organization Ev. Methods Teaching Methods Female
Treated*Post 0.0648* -0.106*** 0.0461 0.0415 0.0106 0.00870 -0.00307
(0.0386) (0.0363) (0.0394) (0.0338) (0.0345) (0.0305) (0.0293)
Constant -0.0934 -0.951*** -0.182* -0.0913 0.213** 0.0646 0.257***
(0.108) (0.111) (0.108) (0.107) (0.104) (0.0992) (0.0932)
Observations 9,881 9,896 9,919 9,488 9,470 9,461 9,971
R-squared 0.401 0.484 0.379 0.309 0.296 0.297 0.381
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
YEAR FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
SCHOOL FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Each observation is a standardized measure of the average of the answers given by all teachers in a given school. The average
length of time that a post-reform principal has been in their position during the time of the study is 1.65 years. Every outcome,
excluding Female, is measured in standard deviations. Community Engagement includes questions such as “How strongly do you agree
with the statement: The principal involves parents in school activities?”, School Violence includes questions such as “How often have
fights between students occurred this year?”, Teacher-Monitoring Practices includes questions such as “How strongly do you agree with
the statement: The principal often comes to observe classes that I teach?”, Class Organization includes questions such as “How often
do you ask students to give a presentation in front of the class?”, Evaluation Methods includes questions such as “How often do you
assign a school project to evaluate students?”, Teaching Methods includes questions such as “How often do you go over test answers
during class?”. Standard errors are clustered at the school level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
A potential bias of the results in Table 3.7 is that the type of teachers who
respond to the questionnaires changes when the post-reform principal is in office.
As we observed in Table 3.6, there are some small differences in the observables
characteristics of the teachers working under post-reform principals which suggest
that the composition of teachers is not constant across time. If a different type
of teacher answered the questionnaire when the post-reform principal is in office,
the observed effects might be simply an artifact of the composition of the teachers
answering the questionnaire, rather than actual changes in the school. There are two
pieces of evidence that I can offer to counter this argument. First, changes in the
composition of teachers in the school are relatively small (see Table 3.6). Second,
the fact that there is no observed change in the gender of teachers answering the
questionnaire suggests that the type of teachers answering the questionnaire does
not change much (Table 3.7, column 7). However, as there may be other dimensions
in which the pool of teachers in treated schools changes, I am not able to fully
address this concern.
Overall, the results suggest that more highly educated and younger principals
improve school climate but do not change the pedagogical practices implemented
by teachers. The low accountability in the Chilean educational system may explain
these results.
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3.4.3 Test Scores
To evaluate the effect of post-reform principals on student test scores, I use
the following difference-in-differences estimator:
Test Scorei,g,s,t = δ+ Φg +αs +γt +β ∗ (treated∗post)s,t +ϕ∗Fi,g,s,t + ei,g,s,t (3.3)
where Test Scorei,g,s,t is the standardized Spanish or mathematics test score
for student i, in grade g, at school s, in year t, Φg is a grade fixed effect, and Fi,g,s,t
controls for the gender of student i, in grade g, at school s, in year t. As before, β
is the difference-in-differences estimator.
Table 3.8: Effect of Post-Reform Principals on Test Scores
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Spanish Spanish Math Math
Treated*Post -0.0155 -0.0148 -0.00896 -0.00929
(0.0115) (0.0114) (0.0117) (0.0117)
Female 0.197*** -0.121***
(0.00341) (0.00317)
Constant -0.228*** -0.324*** -0.235*** -0.176***
(0.0127) (0.0125) (0.0115) (0.0116)
Observations 596,383 596,383 599,196 599,196
R-squared 0.140 0.149 0.187 0.191
CONTROLS NO YES NO YES
YEAR FE YES YES YES YES
SCHOOL FE YES YES YES YES
GRADE FE YES YES YES YES
Notes: Each observation is at the student level. The
average length of time that a post-reform principal has
been in their position during the time of the study is 1.65
years. Spanish and mathematics test scores are measured
in standard deviations. Standard errors are clustered at
the school level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.8 shows the effect of the post-reform principals on test scores. This
table shows no statistically significant results. Given the statistical power that this
setting provides, I am able to rule out an effect larger than 0.025σ on test scores.
One way in which the effects in Table 3.8 might bias is that post-reform
principals could induce some change in student composition. To assess the plausi-
bility of this hypothesis, I test whether the number of students in the school, the
number of students that sat the SIMCE, and students’ genders show some changes
when the post-reform principal is in office. Results in Table 3.9 show no significant
effect for any of these three variables. This suggests that the effects in Table 3.8
are not driven by changes in student characteristics. As a note, results for student
composition are also consistent with the fact that there is no selection process in
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place for students in public schools.
Table 3.9: Effect of Post-Reform Principals on School Composition
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Female Enrollment Students Sitting SIMCE
Treated*Post -0.00556 -1.298 -1.278
(0.00402) (3.871) (0.860)
Constant 0.486*** 410.1*** 60.94***
(0.00393) (3.066) (0.479)
Observations 10,886 10,886 10,886
R-squared 0.670 0.977 0.965
YEAR FE YES YES YES
SCHOOL FE YES YES YES
Notes: Each observation is at the school level. The average
length of time that a post-reform principal has been in their
position during the time of the study is 1.65 years. Female rep-
resents the percentage of female students amongst all students
enrolled in the school. Enrolled Students represents the total
number of students registered in the school. Students Taking
SIMCE is the combined total number of students in fourth,
eighth, and tenth grades who sat the SIMCE test. Standard
errors are clustered at the school level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1
3.4.4 Leads and Lags
Difference-in-differences identifications can suffer from bias when the effect
between the treated and control groups is driven by pre-existing differences in trends.
To assess this, I compute leads and lags for schools that appointed a post-reform
principal in the years 2013 and 2014,25 using the following equation:
Outcomei,g,s,t = δ+Φg+αs+γt+
1∑
t=−4
βt∗treateds∗yeart+ϕ∗Xi,g,s,t+ei,g,s,t (3.4)
where Outcomei,g,s,t is any of the outcome variables presented earlier, and
yeart represents an indicator variable for each year covering the time period from 4
years prior to the post-reform principal being instated (t=-4) to 1 year after their
instatement (t=1), with the year prior (t=-1) being the excluded category.
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show in their upper panels the dynamic effect for post-
25 I perform the calculation for each cohort to avoid sample composition bias, and I exclude the
cohort from 2012 given the small number of observations.
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Figure 3.1: Principal Experience
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Notes: The top panel shows the lead and lag effects for the post-reform principals appointed in
2013, and the lower panel for those appointed in 2014. The excluded category is the year before
the post-reform principal was instated in office. Dots represent a point estimate and the confidence
interval is calculated at a 95% level.
reform principals in the 2013 cohort and in their lower panels the dynamic effect
for the 2014 cohort. Figure 3.1 shows no pre-reform effect on principals’ amount
of experience, and a persistent significant negative effect after the reform for both
cohorts. Figure 3.2 shows neither pre- nor post-reform effect for student test scores
in Spanish for both cohorts. The evidence, overall, supports the assumptions un-
derlying my difference-in-differences estimation strategy.
I further computed leads for all 29 outcomes presented earlier - outcomes
presented in Tables 3.3, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8. These calculations resulted in 174
lead coefficients (29 outcomes * 3 pre-reform periods * 2 cohorts), of which 13 were
significant (7.47%). When testing a null hypothesis at the 10% level, it is common
to reject it in 10% of the cases, even when it is true. In this case, the percentage of
significant leads that reject the null hypothesis is not greater than 10%, and so I do
not consider this to be a major identification flaw.
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Figure 3.2: Spanish Test
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Notes: The top panel shows the lead and lag effects for the post-reform principals appointed in
2013, and the lower panel for those appointed in 2014. The excluded category is the year before
the post-reform principal was instated in office. Dots represent a point estimate and the confidence
interval is calculated at a 95% level.
3.4.5 Robustness Checks
In the final step of the analysis, I show that results hold when comparing
schools of a similar size, and therefore are not explained because schools without
post-reform principals are smaller on average (Section 3.3.6). To perform this anal-
ysis, I run the same regressions as before, but dropping the 10% of the smallest
schools.26
Table 3.10 shows that when considering only the larger schools, post-reform
principals are still younger, less experienced, and more educated. Table 3.11 shows
that post-reform principals in these large schools are also able to decrease violence.
The results for community engagement are no longer significant; however, the point
estimate yields a result similar to the sample of all schools in the study. This suggests
that the loss of significance in this outcome may be due a lack of statistical power
26 These schools have around 150 students or less.
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Table 3.10: Robustness - Effect of Reform on Principals’ Characteristics - Largest
90% of Schools
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES Experience Age Specialization Educational Degree Contract Hours Teaching Hours Female
Treated*Post -7.827*** -5.013*** 0.139*** -0.00463 -0.0392 -0.732 0.0279
(0.684) (0.491) (0.0271) (0.00343) (0.0777) (0.786) (0.0284)
Constant 31.91*** 56.60*** 0.240*** 0.995*** 43.88*** 15.64*** 0.395***
(0.276) (0.198) (0.0127) (0.000589) (0.0342) (0.729) (0.0127)
Observations 7,258 7,258 7,258 7,258 7,258 7,258 7,258
R-squared 0.589 0.628 0.713 0.680 0.407 0.441 0.737
YEAR FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
SCHOOL FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Each observation is at the school level. The average length of time that a post-reform principal has been in
their position during the time of the study is 1.65 years. Experience represents the number of years that the principal
has been working in the educational system. Age is the age of the principal in years. Postgraduate represents whether
or not the principal holds a postgraduate degree. Degree in Education represents whether or not the principal holds
a degree in education. Contract Hours represents the number of contracted hours worked by the principal. Teaching
Hours represents the number of hours that the principal spends teaching classes in school. Female is a dummy variable
representing whether or not the principal is female. Standard errors are clustered at the school level. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
more than a lack of effect . This Table further shows that post-reform principals
seem to do not monitor teachers more closely, and teachers seem to do not change
their pedagogical practices. Finally, Table 3.12 suggest that post-reform principals
in larger schools do not have an effect on students’ test scores, and the minimum
detectable size remains more or less the same when compared with the sample of
all schools.
Table 3.11: Robustness - Effect of Post-Reform Principals on School Climate,
Monitoring Practices, and Pedagogical Methods - Largest 90% of Schools
School Climate Teacher’s Pedagogical Methods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES Community Engagement Violence Monitoring Pract. Class Organization Ev. Methods Teaching Methods Female
Treated*Post 0.0582 -0.0940** 0.0332 0.0335 0.0327 0.0168 -0.0128
(0.0431) (0.0417) (0.0419) (0.0374) (0.0378) (0.0336) (0.0316)
Constant -0.120 -1.180*** -0.107 -0.117 0.118 0.193* 0.253**
(0.127) (0.135) (0.121) (0.125) (0.117) (0.106) (0.101)
Observations 6,980 7,001 7,017 6,795 6,781 6,778 7,031
R-squared 0.413 0.473 0.396 0.296 0.279 0.299 0.388
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
YEAR FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
SCHOOL FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Each observation is a standardized measure of the average of the answers given by all teachers in a given school. The average
length of time that a post-reform principal has been in their position during the time of the study is 1.65 years. Every outcome,
excluding Female, is measured in standard deviations. Community Engagement includes questions such as “How strongly do you agree
with the statement: The principal involves parents in school activities?”, School Violence includes questions such as “How often have
fights between students occurred this year?”, Teacher-Monitoring Practices includes questions such as “How strongly do you agree
with the statement: The principal often comes to observe classes that I teach?”, Class Organization includes questions such as “How
often do you ask students to give a presentation in front of the class?”, Evaluation Methods includes questions such as “How often
do you assign a school project to evaluate students?”, Teaching Methods includes questions such as “How often do you go over test
answers during class?”. Standard errors are clustered at the school level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.12: Robustness - Effect of Post-Reform Principals on Test Scores - Largest
90% of Schools
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Spanish Spanish Math Math
Treated*Post -0.0124 -0.0119 -0.00580 -0.00600
(0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0123) (0.0123)
Female 0.190*** -0.127***
(0.00357) (0.00333)
Constant -0.224*** -0.317*** -0.226*** -0.164***
(0.0135) (0.0133) (0.0121) (0.0123)
Observations 550,173 550,173 552,999 552,999
R-squared 0.144 0.153 0.193 0.197
CONTROLS NO YES NO YES
YEAR FE YES YES YES YES
SCHOOL FE YES YES YES YES
GRADE FE YES YES YES YES
Notes: Each observation is at the student level. The
average length of time that a post-reform principal has
been in their position during the time of the study is 1.65
years. Spanish and mathematics test scores are measured
in standard deviations. Standard errors are clustered at
the school level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
3.5 Concluding Remarks
School principals are typically viewed as an important factor in the edu-
cational production function, as they are considered to impact students’ learning
through their influence on the school climate and teachers’ pedagogical methods.
By exploiting a reform that changes the characteristics of school principals, this
paper has attempted to shed some light on the ways in which a younger, less expe-
rienced, and more educated principal can exert an influence on different aspects of
their school.
Following the reform targeting the appointment of school principals in Chile,
post-reform principals engage more with the school community and reduce the level
of school violence. However, post-reform principals do not seem to be able to improve
teacher-monitoring practices, teachers’ approaches to education and students’ test
scores. This result may be explained by a lack of incentives to perform better in this
school setting, which perhaps counteracts the potential strong positive influence of
principals on the educational production function.
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3.A Appendix: Teacher Questionnaire
3.A.1 Community Engagement
How strongly do you agree with the following statements?
1. The principal creates situations where teachers, parents, and students can
interact.
2. The principal involves parents in school activities.
3. The principal keeps the community informed about the schools academic
achievements.
4. The principal regularly informs the community about his/her achievements as
a principal.
3.A.2 School Violence
How often have the following situations occurred this year?
1. Theft
2. Malicious gossip or exclusion of students.
3. Fights between students.
4. Insults between students.
5. Threats between students.
6. Aggressive incidents involving weapons.
7. Aggressive incidents involving guns being fired.
3.A.3 Teacher-Monitoring Practices
How strongly do you agree with the following statements?
1. The principal evaluates teacher performance in terms of students academic
progress.
2. The principal gives suitable feedback after evaluating teachers.
3. The principal systematically monitors teachers.
4. The principal often comes to observe the class that I teach.
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3.A.4 Class Organization
How often do you do the following during class?
1. Ask students to work in teams.
2. Ask students to work individually.
3. Ask students to give a presentation in front of the class.
4. Ask students to debate different topics.
5. Go outside the classroom to cover a particular topic.
3.A.5 Evaluation Methods
How often do you do the following when evaluating the students?
1. Assign a test with true and false questions.
2. Assign a test with open questions requiring a detailed response.
3. Assign a school project.
4. Self-evaluations.
5. Graded homework.
3.A.6 Teaching Methods
How often do you do the following?
1. Check whether or not students completed their homework.
2. Go over homework answers during class.
3. Re-explain content when not fully understood.
4. Explain until all students fully understand the content.
5. Go over test answers during class.
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3.B Appendix: Tables
Table B1: Test Calendar
Grade Subject 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
2nd Reading X X X X
4th Reading X X X X X X X X X
Math X X X X X X X X X
6th Reading X X X
Math X X X
8th Reading X X X X X X
Math X X X X X X
10th Reading X X X X X X
Math X X X X X X
The X represents years in which the exam take place for the corresponding grade and
subject. Second grade mathematics is not shown as the test does not take place in any
year.
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Chapter 4
Discussion and
Recommendations
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4.1 Chapter 1
Chapter 1 studied the effects of homeownership on labor supply. The results
show that the program studied seems not to affect the labor supply of heads of
households nor of their spouses (i.e. the adults of the household), but does decrease
the labor supply of their children. These results seem to imply that those who have
already decided whether or not they will join the labor market remain unaffected,
while those who are yet to make a decision at the time of receiving assistance are
affected.
Several conclusions could be drawn from these results. First, that the in-
centives presented to heads of households and their spouses are not large enough
to alter their labor market preferences. A potential explanation for this is result is
that, even though the program transfers 10 years worth of wages in the form of a
housing asset to this group, new homeowners cannot effectively perform consump-
tion smoothing by selling, renting, or using this asset as collateral over the period of
time of the study. A behavior worthy of study is what voucher recipients do in terms
of their living arrangements and credit constraints after their five-year restrictive
period has expired. I hope to address this question in future research. Second, the
increase in income that adults face by no longer paying rent is not high enough to
change their decisions regarding their labor supply.1
Children of working age in families who used the voucher joined the labor
market in lower proportions than their non-voucher recipient peers. On average,
this group was in their final two years of high school at the time of application, and
thus had been out of high school for two years at the end point of our study. A
potential explanation for this effect is that low-income families tend to see working-
age children as an additional source of income, but as families see an increase in
income by not paying rent, they tend to put less pressure on their children to join
the labor market. Building on this, these children who do not join the labor market
could use their time in two different ways: 1) increased leisure consumption, in
which case their unemployment should be seen as a luxury good; or 2) enroll in
a tertiary educational institution, in which case the families would be investing in
their children’s human capital. Unfortunately, data availability does not allow us to
disentangle these two mechanisms, and I hope that in future research I will be able
to discern which of these, if any, is the more relevant alternative.
These alternative uses of children’s time could potentially lead to divergent
1 For an average applicant, rent represents around 30 percent of their income, however this may
not be big enough to make them stop working.
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policy recommendations. On the one hand, if children are effectively increasing
their leisure consumption, an incentivization for joining the labor market or study-
ing could be achieved by making the non-repayable nature of the voucher conditional
on having all working-age family members studying, job hunting, or working for a
certain period of time.2 We do not know the potential jobs available to these people,
and so any recommendations along these lines must take this into account. On the
other hand, if these children are enrolling in tertiary education in a higher propor-
tion, this program could represent an opportunity for higher long-term productivity.
In this case, the potential effect of this program on degree completion and income
paths for this group becomes relevant for future research.
4.2 Chapter 2
In this chapter, I showed that the homeownership assistance provided by
the Chilean government does not affect students’ tests scores for those who are in
middle and high school, but decreases the test scores of those in primary school.
Furthermore, the effect seems to vary with age, as it becomes stronger for younger
students. This result seems to be driven by a sharp drop in the probability that
a homeowner family under this program lives in the house of a close relative (e.g.
grandparents), and the consequential reduction in supplementary care provided by
those close relatives.3
One recommendation to this program could be that those families who obtain
the voucher receive a priority seat in public childcare facilities, and thus try to offset
the loss in care provided by close relatives. Complementary childcare assistance must
be carefully considered as it could potentially have a displacement effect: the number
of places in public childcare is usually not enough to cover the whole population, and
so accepting one child implies leaving another one out. Another potential change
worth exploring could be increasing the amount of time permitted to action the
voucher for families living in the house of a close relative and with young children.4
In this case, families could have the option of waiting until their children are older
2 Alternatively, it could be the case that children increasing their leisure consumption in these
voucher recipient families are in fact willing to enroll in further tertiary education, but the
family’s income shock is not high enough to cover educational fees. I do not believe that this a
mechanism at play in this context, as families in these income groups are able to access generous
scholarships and educational credits provided by the government.
3 Recall that around 50 percent of families in the control group live in another family’s house,
usually that of a close relative, and new homeowner families mechanically move to live on their
own.
4 Currently all families have a two-year window in which to use the voucher, otherwise it expires
permanently.
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before moving to their new house, and so the drive towards supplementary care
would become less strong. It is worth noting that this program actively incentivizes
families with young children to receive a voucher by assigning a higher score to those
families. In light of the observed effects of voucher use - a decrease in the learning of
young children but with a small fraction of families living in a house below minimum
living standards - it is not clear whether this is a worthwhile incentive to put in place
in this program.
Overall, this chapter provides evidence of this program having no positive
effects on students’ learning, rather showing that young students tend to be neg-
atively affected. More thought must thus be put in the design of this program in
order to offset the potential loss in supplementary care that young students receive.
4.3 Chapter 3
In the final chapter, I considered the effects of a change in the way in which
the Chilean authorities appoint school principals. The reform granted less discretion
to authorities, by selecting principals through implementing the system used for
civil servants. Data availability allows me to observe “post-reform principals” 1.65
years after they have been in their position. I observed that these principals are on
average younger and more educated, and improved their school climate by reducing
school violence and improving community engagement, but were not able to improve
teacher practices in the classroom or increase student test scores.
First, improving the school climate is particularly relevant in the context
of Chilean education. Over the past 15 years, the proportion of children enrolled
in public schools dropped from 58 to 38 percent. The Ministry of Education pro-
vides anecdotal evidence showing that school violence is more predominant in public
schools, and that school safety is the most relevant criteria for parents deciding where
to enroll their children. Although I have not observed a discernable effect on school
enrollment, this effect may arise in the long run. Moreover, the potential comple-
mentarities of improvements in school climate and student learning could take a
longer time to become evident. I expect to address this in future research.
One explanation for the lack of improvement in teacher practices is the rigid-
ity of the institutional system. In Chile, principals have essentially no say on which
teachers are hired, and current teachers are near-impossible to fire or incentivize. It
could be that, although these principals are more highly educated and presumably
more motivated, they cannot bring teachers who share their values and attitude to
the school. Moreover, current teachers are aware that their performance will have no
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impact on the probability of their contract renewal or their salary, which might put
some constraints on the ways in which principals could better incentivize teachers’
classroom behavior.
One potential future consideration for authorities is to change the way in
which teachers are appointed in Chilean public schools. Currently, teachers are
directly appointed by the mayor, with no supervision; therefore, new teachers do
not necessarily share the same vision as the principal. A system in which new
teachers are appointed in a similar way as principals - through a public offer, where
more qualified professionals are more likely to be appointed, with the principal then
selecting the successful candidate from a shortlist - could increase teacher quality,
and align teachers and principals in their vision for a school. This could reduce the
friction between principals and teacher practices and potentially, in the long run,
foster improvements in teachers’ classroom practices and students’ learning.
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